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Emmanuel Levinas introduces a new philosophy of phenomenology challenging to 
traditional philosophy.  One of the key concepts he utilizes is notion of desire with a 
radically new and strong sense. He identifies desire as metaphysical aspect which 
transcends given meaning for notion of desire as a personal, subjective emotion, for 
centuries. By this way he suggests new structure of relation in which man cannot be 
reduced to a mere object of the subject.   Likewise, the final emancipation and liberated 
personality that Buddhism proposes transcend constrains of subjectivism. The arahant is 
considered as a person who acts not based on his individual needs but from others‟ 
requirement. As arahant has transcended individual constrains of the personality such as 
greed, hatred, and delusion, he clearly displays a radically different behavior from a 
mundane person according to Buddhism.  
 
Both these analyses present radically different views to the prevailing systems of 
philosophy in India and Europe respectively. The final analysis is that disregarding the 
value of other is not natural. The original nature of the man is not individual. This 
positive mode of the human is explained by Levinas using the notion of Desire for 
other. Its conclusion is that life is valuable and therefore a human being cannot harm or 
kill another. In the same manner the Buddha, arahant are fully devoted for others‟ 
wellbeing as they have reconstructed their personality or as they have reached to the 
realization in which individuality is dissolved. In this research I have utilized the notion 
of desire in its ethical sense though it is radically different from traditional ethics. My 
suggestion is that irrespective of some differences easily found in two traditions, the 
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most common and significant aspect of the both is emphasize done on the necessity of 
reforming human personality on a new philosophic ground. The strong philosophic 
ground for this radical change is presented in both traditions and desire is utilized in this 
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Chapter One  
 
Introduction 
1.0 BACKGROUND OF STUDY 
 
Generally, the term desire is used to mean craving, want, wishes, hopes etc. people 
often speak of desiring to watch a movie or desiring to eat or drink or to see a friend. 
People also talk of rational and irrational desires. Going by the general sense of the 
term, many see Buddhist teaching as advocating the end of all desires. In the second 
truth of the Four Noble Truths, Buddhism teaches that craving (tahā) is the basis of 
suffering (dukkha). Therefore, to attain nirvāna one has to seek an end to all desires. 
This view is based on a very simplistic understanding of desires in Buddhism. Though 
Buddhism seeks the end of cravings, it can be said that there is a desire to end desires. 
In other words desiring to end desire is also a form of desire. 
 
However, one can decipher a problem of conflation here. A question may be raised on 
the difference between “willing” and “desiring” or what is the relationship between 
“will” and “desire.” Will is often seen as “intention,” that is, the mental occurrence 
that leads us to action. Willed action is intentional, rather than accidental. Now, not all 
desires lead to action but this also is not a  major difference  since our will—as 
intention—often fails to be fulfilled or can be restrained. So in what does the 
difference lie? Since my preoccupation is not to resolve any problem or settle the 
difference between willing and desiring, I would be content to say that most acts of 
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willing can be seen as consequences of desire. This means that when one has a desire 
for something, he or she can respond to such desire by willing an action that will 
respond to such desire.   
 
Many writers often use “will” to encompass both desire and intention. However, I 
think that a distinction is necessary in general terms. In a specific Buddhist context,   
“will” as cetana or adhihna has specific functions and consequences distinct and 
distinguishable from forms of desiring. Writing in his book on desire, G.F Schueler gave 
two senses of the term desire: 
 
The distinction between two senses of the term ‘desire’: on one side is 
what might be called the philosophers’ sense, in which, as G.E.M 
Anscombe says, ‘the primitive sign of wanting is trying to get,’ that is, 
the sense in which desires are so to speak automatically tied to actions 
because the term ‘desire’ is understood so broadly as to apply to 
whatever moves someone to act.1   
 
Obviously this understanding of desires does not immediately equate any action with 
desires; if so then actions that are externally induced without intentions will also count 
as actions emanating from desires. Here I am referring to forced or coerced actions. 
For instance in cases of rape, where a victim performs an act which he or she does not 
                                                 
1
 Schueler, G. F., Desire: Its Role in Practical Reason and the Explanation of Action (Massachusetts: 




intend. Such actions cannot count as actions that are tied to desires. Schueler 
continues to outline the second sense. 
 
On the other side of the more ordinary sense, in which one can do 
things one has no desire to do, that is, the sense in which one can 
reflect on one’s desires, try to figure out what one wants, compare 
one’s own desires with the desires of others or the requirement of 
morals, the law, etiquette or prudence, and in the end perhaps even 
decide that some desires one has, even very strong ones should not be 
acted on at all.2 
 
This distinction is very important for this work. This sense of the term tells us how we 
relate to desires. It is in this sense that Buddhism explicitly tells us that there are 
certain desires that should not push us to action. The Buddhist idea of right intention 
involves, in part a renunciation of desires. “The way of the world is the way of desire, 
and the unenlightened who follow this way flow with the current of desire, seeking 
happiness by pursuing the objects in which they imagine they will find fulfillment”3 and 
the Dhammapada seems to say that we have desires that we must combat.  
 
Whoever in this world, overcomes this hard-to-overcome, base craving 
From him sorrows fall, like water drips from a lotus. (Stanza: 336) 
 
                                                 
2
  Ibid.            
3
  Bodhi, Bhikkhu., The Noble Eightfold Path: Way to the End of Suffering (Seattle: Buddhist  Publication   
Society Edition, 2000).  p. 33 
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This teaching of renouncing certain desires and the idea of reflecting on our desires 
can be said to be a pointer to something, that is, to a physical or bodily basis of much 
of our desires. While desires can be seen as mental attitudes or dispositions, much of 
our desiring has obvious physical roots. Here one may point to desires that are 
generated by our physical survival needs like food, shelter and our desires that are not 
directly related to our physical survival needs. For instance, my desire to see an old 
friend who has been away from me for a very long time. These physical bases of desire 
often generate tensions or conflict. These tensions or conflicts often arise based on the 
limited nature of the thing being desired vis-a-vis the number of people desiring it or 
due to what Buddhism refers to as ignorance (avijjā).  
 
When many people are competing for limited goods, they often times resort to 
violence in sorting out whose desire will triumph, that is, who will appropriate the 
physical object, be it food or land or water. Ignorance of the perpetual flux of desires, 
as Buddhism teaches makes people to believe in constancy of the self or feelings. They 
tend to believe falsely that their feelings will endure and they strive to acquire physical 
things that will satisfy their feelings. In countering such idea, Buddhism teaches about 
anicca and annata, that is the doctrines of continuous change and that of 
impermanence of the self. The realization of the non- existence of the self is a prelude 
to a holy life; it is the first step to moral life, a knowledge which helps one to 
appreciate others rather than antagonizing them and becoming hostile in the bid to 
preserve the self. The doctrine of non-self (anatta) and continuous change (annica) are 
doctrines that promote mutual co-operation and unity. What Buddhism is emphasizing 
in essence is that desires, especially when related to physical objects has to be checked 
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less they grow monstrous and overwhelm the human being and causing him to lose 
rationality, hence the need for the  eightfold path. 
 
Buddhism insists on right attitudes as articulated in the eightfold path. Among the right 
attitudes are right thought, right mindfulness and right concentration. Right thoughts 
are those thoughts that are free from lustful attachment or greed, thoughts associated 
with renunciation, thoughts free from malevolence or hatred and thoughts free from 
violent intention. (In Buddhism, malevolent thoughts must be substituted with 
benevolent moral thoughts.) Right mindfulness is the attention that keeps watch over 
the mind and prevents evil thoughts from entering it. It guides all aspects of mental, 
verbal and bodily behaviour, giving them the right moral direction. This may be seen as 
the alertness that is necessary to observe and check evil tendencies. Right 
concentration stands for the clear, composed and un-confounded mental condition 
which is conducive for the dawning of wisdom resulting in final elimination of all evil 
dispositions and culminating in the perfection of moral character. 
 
If these right attitudes are maintained, the individual will in the long run attain nirvana, 
help others and also help in ending suffering. By insisting on the right attitudes to be 
cultivated, Buddhism can be seen to be advocating a form of desire. This can be 
referred to as altruistic desire. It is a desire that goes beyond the physical needs, being 
detached from them in order to help the other person and end suffering. This desire is 




Buddhism teaches the doctrines propagated by the Buddha. However, during the 
course of history, Buddhism underwent different changes and branched into different 
schools like the Mahyna (great vehicle) and Hinayna (minor vehicle). These schools 
have certain differences in rites and practice but they agree regarding fundamental 
teachings. I will however base my discussion of the Buddhist doctrines on what is 
regarded as Pali Buddhism or Therevada. Pali Buddhism is that version of Buddhism 
that draws its scriptural inspiration from the Tipitaka, or Pali canon, which scholars 
generally agree contains the earliest surviving record of the Buddha's teachings. 
 
The kind of desire being emphasized by Buddhism with regard to the other person or 
human being is by no means limited to Buddhism or Eastern philosophy. Such 
emphasis can also be found in Western philosophies. One of the places that such 
emphasis can be found is in the writings of Emmanuel Levinas, a continental 
philosopher. In Levinas,  “Desire” has a meaning radically  different from popular 
philosophical usage of his time. Here, ‘Desire’ appears to imply a particular kind of 
human drive.4 However it is crucial to distinguish this particular drive from ‘drive 
theory’ which is considered as one of the three prominent theories of motivation in 
psychology. According to ‘drive theory,’ one acts to satisfy motives.  When one is 
motivated by a drive he/she acts to reduce the drive i.e. hunger. Moreover, this is 
closer to an effort biologically taken to maintain a balanced life of an organism.  
 
Levinasian desire differs from this drive theory. Here, desire is oriented towards the 
Other. The Other here is not an object that will be used to fill a void.  Levinas, though, 
                                                 
4
 This is not about psychological drive theory. 
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was not oblivious of the fact that we as human beings desire some objects which are 
needed to fill a kind of void in us. The desire for food assuages our hunger-drive but 
Desire here receives a metaphysical turn, a kind of yearning that is insatiable. Writing 
about this kind of desire Levinas says: 
 
No journey, no change of climate or of scenery could satisfy the desire 
bent toward it. The other metaphysically desired is not “other” like the 
bread I eat, the land in which I dwell, the landscape I contemplate, like, 
sometimes, myself for myself, this “I,” that “other.” I can “feed” on 
these realities and to a very great extent satisfy myself, as though I had 
simply been lacking them. Their alterity is thereby reabsorbed into my 
identity as a thinker or a possessor. The metaphysical desire tends to 
something else entirely towards the absolutely other.5 
 
Desire for the other, be he an orphan, widow or stranger may not in itself be bereft of 
a wrong intention. My desire for the other can take the form of self- love. Here love 
can congeal into my seeing the other as my alter ego.  The wrong intention in this 
sense is that of trying to make or mould the other in my own image, genus or class. 
However, Levinas insists that “the absolutely other is the Other.” This means that 
there cannot be a sum of I and the Other in the mathematical sense of summing up 
two identical things or things of the same quantities or qualities. For instance the sum 
of one and another one yields two (1+1 =2) in other words, a congregation or 
association that is made up of “I” and the “other” cannot be referred to as a plural of 
                                                 
5
 Levinas, E., Totality and Infinity ( London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,1979).  p.  39 
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the “I.” The stranger or the orphan whom I intend to assist or help cannot be 
encapsulated in my world. He is also free and I have no power over him.6  
 
In the end Levinas proposes a model of relationship with the other whom I desire. This 
relationship is primarily based on language and can be referred to a relationship based 
on an ethics of conversation and responsibility. I desire the other to know him by 
entering into a conversation with him. However, such conversation in order to be true 
and just must be devoid of rhetorics, that is, a conversation that obfuscates the 
freedom of the other, a conversation that approaches the other not to face him as he 
or she is. In other words what is needed is a veritable conversation.7   
 
1.1  Aim of Research 
 
Emmanuel Levinas presents an analysis of a specific desire, namely ‘desire for other.’ 
This kind of desire has an ethical turn with reference to the other. However, this 
ethical dimension or inclination cannot be considered as a training given by religion or 
any kind of ethical system, rather it is metaphysical in a special sense. However, he 
seems to suggest that this positive inclination can be suppressed due to various 
reasons be it cultural, educational, or economical. Nonetheless this temporary 
suppression does not suggest that human beings have eliminated this inclination, since 
according to him we cannot suppress this inclination without acquiring a bad 
conscience. One’s fellow human beings are essential part of one’s life. Therefore, for 
                                                 
6
  Ibid., p. 33 
7
  Ibid., p. 70 
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Levinas a human being cannot kill other human beings. He cannot harm them.  Doing 
so is contradictory to humanity.  
 
In the same vein, early Buddhism holds that human beings are pure by nature. This 
does not mean that they are originally pure. The idea is that they are naturally good. 
They are defiled by various external circumstances. For Buddhism these defilements 
may come from their present life or via their past life.  Purification of defilement is 
identified as perfect emancipation in Buddhism. It is to be done by the human being 
using his skills without any interference of any divine being. After being enlightened he 
is completely devoted to others’ wellbeing. In addition, the Buddhist notion of desire 
has three basic meanings. One of them is ‘desire for one’s fellow beings.’ It can be 
seen as the ground of ordinary peoples’ pro-social behaviour.  The most developed 
form of altruistic behaviour is positioned in the enlightened personality. As this 
personality is free from all, internal or external, obstacles he is fully-devoted to others’ 
welfare. He acts for others’ wellbeing either as a teacher or a spiritual friend. 
  
Both analyses attempt to unveil a particular human inclination. Both attempt to guide 
human beings to a rich position in which the assistance of one’s fellow human being 
manifests clearly or bring out in specific contexts this inclination. The prevailing social 
condition is mostly egocentric and both systems (Buddhism and Levinas) seek to 
transcend prevailing way of thinking. For this purpose they have used the notion of 
‘desire’ in a special sense. This is a great move to change the established system of 
thinking. The aim of this research then is to examine the grounds that make this ethical 
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desire for the other possible and what—if any—does an emphasis on such desire—as 
seen in both systems—seek to achieve.  
 
1.2  Significance of Research  
 
The significance of this research is to emphasize the need for communication and 
assistance for the other person irrespective of differences. Only by assisting the other 
without first assimilating him or her in my system (religion, caste, nation, etc) can one 
be faithful and authentic to his or her self and in doing so aim to alleviate suffering. In 
other words, insisting on preconditions (the other to be like me) or trying to deceive or 
do injustice to the other by not allowing him or her to be his or her true self, one 
cannot be said to be aiming to alleviate suffering.  
 
1.3  Structure of Research  
  
This research will be divided into four chapters. This first chapter is an explanation of 
the concept involved in this writing.  The second chapter is an exposition of the 
grounds for desire in Levinasian philosophy. This includes understanding the self and 
the Other and how this metaphysical desire with an ethical turn plays out between the 
self and the Other. Chapter three will be an exposition of the grounds of desire in 
Budhism, illustrating how desire manifests itself in different Buddhists’ personalities 
and thoughts. Chapter four identifies and discuses similarities and differences of the 
interpretation offered by the two traditions on the grounds of desire. The final chapter 




I will argue here that in spite of the differences that these two thoughts have, 
Levinasian notion of Desire is comparable with the Buddhist concept of desire in 
certain areas.  I will focus my attention on how desire in Levinasian philosophy relates 




2.0   THE GROUNDS, STRUCTURE AND ETHICAL TURN OF DESIRE IN 
LEVINASIAN PHILOSOPHY 
 
The continental philosopher Emmanuel Levinas was born in Lithuania in 1906. He went 
to France in 1923 and studied Herson Bergson’s Philosophy8 at the University of 
Strasbourg. He studied under Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger from 1928 to 
1929 at the University of Freiburg. He finally taught at the University of Sorbonne in 
1973 and retired in 1979. The rest of his life was dedicated to philosophical writings. 
Emmanuel Levinas can be considered a phenomenologist with a new line of argument. 
He claimed that his method is phenomenology. In an interview he said:  
 
                                                 
8
 Craig, E. (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Vol. 5. (New York: Routledge. 1998).  P. 579 
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Phenomenology represented the second, but undoubtedly the most 
important, philosophical influence in [his] thinking. Indeed, from the 
point of view of philosophical method and discipline, [he] remain[s] to 
this day a phenomenologist.9  
 
Phenomenology as an area of study aims to unearth the pre-reflective meaning 
structures that condition human life and thought. Levinas’ own thought was first 
presented in an essay titled ‘Evasion’ (1935) and then he published another two 
significant short studies; Existence and existents (1978), and Time and the Other 
(1987). Levinas’s publication of ‘Is Ontology Fundamental?’ signifies a landmark 
departure from the ontology of western philosophy particularly on ethics and on the 
alterity of the other human beings.  For most critics, his two major philosophical texts 
Totality and Infinity (1969), Otherwise than Being (1981,) represent the culmination of 
his writings. Though Levinas has other writings, this research will revolve around 
Totality and Infinty while taking cognizance of other writings. 
 
2.1  The Self and the Other 
 
 Levinas identifies the structure of human experience in the relation of the same and  
Other  (alterity).  Desire is identified in this system as the key in building up and 
sustaining the relation of the two. However, it is important to understand the 
difference between the two, i.e. the subject and the other. The key question here is 
                                                 
9
 Kearney, Richard., „Interview with Levinas‟ in Richard Kearney [ed.], Dialogue with Contemporary     
Continental Thinkers: The Phenomenological Heritage  (United Kingdom: Manchester University 
Press. 1984)  p. 50  
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what constitutes the identities of the two? How do the subject and the other acquire 
their different identities? 
 
2.1.1  The Self 
 
2.1.1.1  Enjoyment as a Subject Making Factor 
 
 Levinas holds that the self acquires its identity mainly by an act of isolation. The self 
isolates itself from what is not a part of it. Nuyen, writing in “Identitarian Thinking” 
summarizes it thus: 
 
 Levinas begins by showing that the subject, the “I,” acquires its identity 
as subject by first separating or isolating itself from what is not itself. 
This is achieved in the process of satisfying desires, or the process of 
enjoyment, in which one becomes aware of one’s own happiness and 
unhappiness, thus aware of one’s own ipseity as a unique being.10  
 
What this means is that enjoyment is a subject making factor. The being that enjoys 
knows himself as a separate entity from others. However, this knowledge of the self 
also means that one is conscious of other entities. He does not enjoy himself but 
enjoys through things. Enjoyment of something means that one has and uses things. As 
                                                 
10
  Nuyen, Anh Tuan., ““Identitarian Thinking” and the Social Sciences: From Adorno to Levinas”, 




Levinas puts it “Enjoyment is the ultimate consciousness of all the contents that fill my 
life- it embraces them.”11  
 
It is also pertinent to point out that enjoyment in Levinasian philosophy is not just a 
psychological state which empirical psychology may account for or may verify. Instead 
of taking ‘enjoyment’ as a mere psychological state, Levinas introduces it as sense of 
accomplishment, a thirst that seeks an accomplishment. When memory recalls the 
accomplishment and thirsts for more, it is already an enjoyment. This means that 
enjoyment displays the potency of the man. One lives in enjoyment. It is a doing word, 
that is to say that in enjoyment one is not just a passive receptor of stimuli from the 
senses but an actor. Enjoyment of life means that one is more than one. It does not 
express man’s mode of implantation, that is his disposition in the Heideggerian sense 
of being in the world but rather an active agent.  By employing this meaning, Levinas 
seems to say that in seeking happiness or being capable of enjoyment, one goes 
beyond mere dispositional states and engage in activity.  Levinas puts it thus:  
 
Enjoyment is not a psychological state among others, the affective 
totality of empirical psychology, but the very pulsation of the I.  In 
enjoyment we maintain ourselves always at the second power…. For 
happiness, in which we move already by the simple fact of living, is 
always beyond being, in which the things are hewn…. Enjoyment is 
made of the memory of its thirst; it is a quenching. It is the act that 
remembers its “potency.”  It does not express (as Heidegger would have 
                                                 
11
  Levinas, Emmanuel., Totality and Infinity, op., cit., p. 110 
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it ) the mode of my implantation- my disposition – in being, the tonus of 
my bearing. It is not my bearing in being, but already the exceeding of 
being….12        
 
Enjoyment is related to memory and it (enjoyment) is quenchable by provision. Both 
memory and quenchability elucidate the subjectiveness of enjoyment. It is clear that 
one’s memory is directly related to subjectivity. Memory has a major role in making 
one’s identity.  
 
Another issue worthy of mentioning here is that the idea of the self or the subjectivity 
of the subject advocated by Levinas is neither a biological nor a sociological given. In 
the biological identification of the self, one is identified as belonging to a race or to a 
specie. Subjectivity as a product of enjoyment is not the making of an impersonal will 
or the product of evolution. Rather the action of the person whose memory and 
activity portrays his potency as a being who can accomplish things. Accomplishment 
and memory on their own can also confer a sociological identity. One belonging to a 
class by his achievement identifies himself with reference to such a class to the 
exclusion of others who are not the members of such a class or who do not project the 
same idea or philosophy of life. Levinas explicitly states that:  
 
The notion of the separated person which we have approached in the 
description of enjoyment, which is posited in the independence of 
                                                 
12
 Ibid., p. 113 
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happiness, is to be distinguished from the notion of person such as it is 
fabricated by the philosophy of life or of race.13   
 
The problem with identification or subjectivity brought about by a biological or 
sociological action can be said to be two-fold. One the biological identification of the 
self in a race or species fixes the person into a group or class that cannot be revised or 
increased. One is ontologically identified, hence not an existent. On the other hand, to 
identify the subject with an idea or a philosophy of life is to identify him in a totality or 
through an opposition to another totality. Levinas rejects totalization in itself, either as 
an act of enclosing one in a concept or identifying him by opposing another concept. In 
other words enjoyment as a subject making factor is solitary. It has no reference class 
nor is opposed to one. As Levinas puts it: 
 
 The breach of the totality that is accomplished by the enjoyment of 
solitude—or the solitude of enjoyment—is radical…. The upsurge of the 
self beginning in enjoyment, where the substantiality of the I is 
apperceived not as the subject of the verb to be, but as implicated in 
happiness is the exaltation of the existent as such.14  
 
In another place he writes:  
 
In enjoyment I am absolutely for myself. Egoist without reference to the 
Other, I am alone without solitude, innocently egoist and alone. Not 
                                                 
13
 Ibid., p. 120 
14
  Ibid., p. 119 
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against the Others, not “as for me…”—but entirely deaf to the Other, 
outside of all communication and all refusal to communicate- without 
ears, like a hungry stomach.15  
 
Another significant concept that connects that of enjoyment in Levinasian philosophy 
is nourishment or “living from.” Nourishment is identified as the essence of enjoyment 
in Levinasian philosophy. Moreover, it is understood as reducing the other into the 
needs of the same. The other provides fuel or carburant for the functioning of the self. 
One nourishes oneself by reducing the other into egoistic needs. The other’s energy, 
strength, and power become mine in nourishment. Levinas says that:  
 
Nourishment, as a means of invigoration, is the transmutation of the 
other into the same, which is in the essence of enjoyment: an energy 
that is other, recognized as other, recognized, we will see, as sustaining 
the very act that is directed upon it, becomes, in enjoyment, my own 
energy, my strength, me. All enjoyment is in this sense alimentation.16   
 
 In Levinasian philosophy, to live is to have a relationship with direct objects of life, 
that is, things that can provide nourishment to life, say bread. And to have a 
relationship with direct objects of life is to have a relationship with nourishment. 
When there is a relation with them, this relation nourishes itself as well and at the 
same time fills life with sadness or joyful moments. This means that in addition to 
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direct objects of life, there is also a relation with that relation. This relation can easily 
be referred to as labour. Levinas gives an explicit example with bread. One lives from 
bread.  However, to live from bread, one has to earn bread. To earn bread one needs 
to nourish himself. Therefore, the bread I eat means both the means I earn bread and 
my life. To live from bread is therefore “not to represent bread to oneself, nor to act 
on it nor to act by means of it.”17  This means that I live from both bread and from my 
labour. 
 
Living from connotes hunger. The self is a hungry being. This means that 
being hungry is a dual awareness. Firstly one is aware of what will 
assuage the hunger and secondly the enjoyment it will bring, in the 
sense of feeling the pangs or the cessation of it when he or she eats. 
Hunger is often talked about in reference to food. In this sense, living 
from will be living from food and enjoyment and nourishment will refer 
solely to food. However, Levinas suggests that we not only live from 
food but from other non-edible things that we use. For Levinas man 
‘lives from’ a number of things such as air, light, spectacles, work, ideas, 
sleep, etc.18  
 
Levinas also rejects any connection of enjoyment from these other non-edible things 
to totalization. That is to say that by using these things, I cannot be identified through 
any kind of set they can be collectively identified with. For instance, my using a set of 
instruments termed building instruments cannot identify me as a being whose 
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enjoyment is constituted solely by building instruments. It then means that the things 
we enjoy cannot form a complete set. There not forming a complete set does not 
mean that certain tools or instruments cannot be grouped under a certain name or 
term which in a banal sense can be termed totalization. However, insofar as such tools 
are tools used by man and thereby providing enjoyment, those tools cannot be 
totalized by virtue of their being things that can be enjoyed.  Therefore, utilization of 
tools does not provide a final aim for such tools in such a way that the final aim forms 
the concept for totalizing such tools. Levinas  says: 
 
The things that are not tools- the crust of bread, the flame in the 
fireplace, the cigarette- offer themselves to enjoyment. But this 
enjoyment accompanies every utilization of things, even in a complex 
enterprise where the end of labor alone absorbs the research. ..     
Activity does not derive its meaning and its value from an ultimate and 
unique goal, as though the world formed one system of use-references 
whose term touches our every existence. ..   To enjoy without utility, in 
pure loss, gratuitously, without referring to anything else, in pure 
expenditure- this is the human.19  
 
Though things are related with enjoyment but they cannot be absorbed by the self, 
since “enjoyment precisely does not reach them qua things.”20 They take form within a 
medium, space, air, earth, along the road etc.   It is impossible to reduce this medium 
into a totality or systems. Things cannot be chosen solely via the hand or eyes.  The 
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medium through which they are gotten hold of retains its common feature without 
belonging specifically to any of the senses.  
 
In the end, happiness is the reason for enjoyment. Life is originally happy for Levinas. 
However, dissatisfaction and sorrow are possible in a human personality as happiness 
exists as one of the original characteristics of a person. Suffering is possible only when 
there is an opposite characteristic of enjoyment. Happiness emerges when needs are 
provided. Moreover, it is a personal achievement. If one is contented and satisfied in 
his achievements happiness is produced. Happiness satisfies the need of ego. In other 
words, “Happiness is a principle of individuation, but individuation in itself is 
conceivable only from within, through interiority….”21 
 
 It can then be said that subjectivity originates in the sovereignty of enjoyment. 
Levinas, however, uses different words to signify this subjectivity. Sometimes, he 
refers to it as atheism, or as being at home with oneself, sometimes as egoism or 
sensibility. As he puts it: 
 
To be I, atheist, at home with oneself, separated, happy, created – these 
are synonyms. Egoism, enjoyment, sensibility, and the whole dimension 
of interiority – the articulations of separation- are necessary for the idea 
of Infinity, the relation with the Other which opens forth from the 
separated and finite being.22  
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2.1.1.2  Enjoyment as No Solipsism  
 
It is pertinent to point out at this point that while Levinas emphasized the solitary 
nature of enjoyment, it does not mean the self or the subject lives in a solipsist 
environment. The subject as a being who enjoys himself recognizes the presence of 
others.  Enjoyment in itself may encounter interference or contributing factors through 
other people.  Nuyen points out that isolation “also leads to the awareness of other 
people who can contribute to or interfere with one’s own enjoyment. The I has to deal 
with, or to be engaged in a commerce with, other people, with “the other.””23 
 
The recognition of the “other” is not just a recognition of a person who can interfere or 
contribute to the happiness of the self with no real relation. The other is related to the 
self in a special way which can be termed metaphysical. This metaphysical relationship 
is recognized by the self as a relationship of responsibility. Levinas puts it thus: 
 
To utter “I,” to affirm the irreducible singularity in which the apology is 
pursued, means to possess a privileged place with regard to 
responsibilities for which no one can replace me and from which no one 
can release me. To be unable to shirk: this the I.24 
 
 Levinas thereby expresses the essential and inevitable link between the self and the 
Other—the other person in his radical alterity. This means that I have a special 
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relationship with the other person or human being, a human being that is stripped of 
my pretensions or my preconceptions of him. This other person that is devoid of my 
totalizing attempts is the absolutely other, that is the Other.  This relationship is not 
chosen by the self. It is forced upon it.  This metaphysical relationship of responsibility 
is the foundation of Levinasian ethics. In conversation with Richard Kearney,  Levinas 
affirms that the I cannot escape the answerability to the other. He says:  
 
It is my inescapable and incontrovertible answerability to the other that 
makes me an individual ‘I’. So that I become a responsible or ethical ‘I’ 
to the extent that I agree to dispose or dethrone myself.25   
 
 2.1.2  The Other  
 
 2.1.2.1  The Other is not a Need but an Object of Desire 
 
Since the self recognizes the other as a being who can interfere or contribute to his 
happiness, it may be right to say that the self needs the other. However, in Levinasian 
philosophy, the concept of need has a different meaning from its general sense of 
wanting or longing for a thing. In this general sense, one can want or long for a human 
being, can long for the other.  For him, need refers to a privation, a lack in being that 
yearns for a filling. In other words by filling a void, the need ceases to be a need, the 
hunger for the thing is satiated.  He says that “need, a happy dependence, is capable 
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of satisfaction, like a void, which gets filled.” 26 In this sense, men need certain things 
for their existence.  
 
Therefore ‘need’ refers to that essential requirement of life. That is those things that 
keep life going, for instance food. This means that the provision or filling up of needs 
is essential for enjoyment and the nourishment of life. The assumption here is that 
need is an affect and it is necessarily egoistic and self-oriented. Levinas also holds 
that need is not a mere simple lack or deficiency but also a thing to be happy for. It 
provides an avenue for living. Thus man is happy to be in need. He can also master 
his needs for his enjoyment. He says:  
 
Need cannot be interpreted as a simple lack, despite the psychology of 
need given by Plato, nor as pure passivity, despite Kantian ethics. The 
human being thrives on his needs; he is happy for his needs. The 
paradox of “the living from something,” or, as Plato would say, the folly 
of these pleasures, is precisely in  a complacency with regard to what 
life depends on- not a mastery on the one hand and a dependence on 
the other, but a mastery in this dependence. This is perhaps the very 
definition of complacency and pleasure.27    
 
In contrast to the notion of need, Desire tends to that which cannot satisfy. Therefore 
Desire is distinguishable from need and satisfaction. As needs are generally connected 
with materiality, they are easily providable given that enough material resources are 
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available in the world. Thus, satisfaction is not impossible. On the contrary, Desire is 
spiritual and insatiable.  Levinas holds that the subject “having recognized its needs as 
material needs, as capable of being satisfied, the I can henceforth turn to what it does 
not lack. It distinguishes the material from the spiritual, opens to Desire.”28  
 
One can satisfy one’s needs by filling gaps of longing. Needs provide avenues for 
alimentation, a case where the other is assimilated by the subject and invigorates it.  
The subject understands his needs and intends to fill the void. Desire on its own is non-
intentional, it cannot generate an avenue to fill a void. In the words of Levinas: 
 
 In need I can sink my teeth into the real and satisfy myself in 
assimilating the other; in Desire there is no sinking one’s teeth into 
being, no satiety, but an uncharted future before me. Indeed time 
presupposed by need is provided me by Desire; human need already 
rests on Desire.29 
 
Need presupposes desire, since desire is metaphysical. Desire is thus a movement 
towards something that does not satisfy. The other that is being desired cannot satisfy 
since it is not like bread which can be eaten, or a landscape that can be gazed upon. 
Desire tends towards something that Levinas called the absolutely other. This 
absolutely other is the human being, the other person. It is this other person that 
draws the subject unlike need which emanates from the subject itself. Thus, “desire is 
an aspiration that the desirable animates; it originates from its “object”; it is relation- 
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whereas need is the void of the soul; it proceeds from the subject.”30   This state does 
not produce happiness since the being desiring is already happy. Levinas thus refers to 
it as the misfortune of the happy, a luxurious need.31   
 
2.1.2.2  The Other is a Transcendent 
 
The other is not a “need” and hence cannot be instrumentally used for one’s egoistic 
purposes. However, it is an object of desire. The question then remains, what exactly is 
this other that is being desired. Every effort to understand the other via any already 
acquired experience according to Levinas fails. The subject may possess the knowledge 
of itself but cannot use such knowledge to understand the other, hence any analogical 
knowledge of the other fails.  Levinas admits that the other person as one who comes 
before me, whom I encounter in various capacities is not an alter ego, another self 
with different properties and accidents but in all essential respects like me. The other 
person in all respects is different from me since he inhabits a world that is basically 
other than mine and is essentially different from me.   
 
Another way of understanding a thing apart from analogy can be said to be through 
concepts and themes. The question will then be if this object of desire can be 
understood via concepts and themes? In other words can it be objectified? Levinas 
again says that  “the Other alone eludes thematization”32 this is to say that the Other is 
beyond the limit of objectification. That which is beyond the limits of objectification 
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and eludes thematization can best be called a transcendent. The Other is a 
transcendent. 
 
The Other being a transcendent does not mean that no relationship can be forged with 
it. A relationship can exist between the self and the Other. However, since the Other 
eludes conceptualization, the relationship cannot have the formal structures of formal 
logic but a relation that overturns the dictates of formal logic. In such a relationship, 
the self or the subject can have the idea of the Other and think about him. But again, 
thinking here is not considered as thinking an object. Levinas says that: 
 
The transcendent is the sole ideatum of which there can be only an idea 
in us; it is infinitely removed from its idea, that is, exterior, because it is 
infinite. To think the infinite, the transcendent, the stranger, is hence 
not to think an object.33 
 
By positing the Other as transcendence and the possibility of having a relationship with 
this Other, Levinas seems to have entered the realm of religion. People often ascribe 
the quality of transcendence to God and other non-visible entities or to human beings 
who are said to participate in the lives of these entities. However, the idea of 
transcendence in Levinas seems to go beyond the traditional religious views on 
transcendence. He says that: 
 
                                                 
33
 Ibid., p. 49 
27 
 
Transcendence is to be distinguished from a union with the 
transcendent by participation. The metaphysical relation, the idea of 
infinity, connects with the noumenon  which is not a numen. This 
noumenon is to be distinguished from the concept of God possessed by 
believers of positive religions…. The idea of infinity, the metaphysical 
relation, is the dawn of a humanity without myths.34 
 
The only relationship that can exist between the self and the Other, since that of 
thematization and analogy is discounted, can be referred to as the ethical relationship. 
Ethics is then the spiritual optics by which the self can view the Other. 
 
2.2  Desire and Ethics 
 
Transcendence is related to an ethical culture which Levinas wished to establish 
contrary to what he referred to as the self-dominating ethics. 35 For him, one 
transcends interiority in an ethical relationship with the other. This relationship is first 
of all a relationship of responsibility and obligation.  Ethics is generally identified as an 
examination or the evaluation of human conduct, behavior, goals, dispositions, 
intentions, ways of life, will and institutions. Ethics in philosophy attempts to answer 
certain general questions about the good life and the right ways of achieving it. 
Philosophical ethics is normative, that is, using reason alone to analyze and establish 
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rightful ways of conduct. It thereby makes use of such concepts as duty, obligation and 
right. 
 
In this sense, Levinas’ central concern seems to be that of ethics, though his approach 
to it is not the same when compared to traditional understanding of ethics. The 
references he made to key ethical terms such as good and bad, rights, obligation, and 
duty do not take the same reference as in traditional ethics. He often uses some 
concepts such as ‘commanded’, ‘face’, ‘same’ and ‘Other’, ‘vulnerability’, ‘totality’, 
‘stranger’ which have indirect relation to traditional ethics. He uses those terms and 
concepts to imply a new ethical ground that he establishes. Thus it is difficult to 
determine the relationship of these concepts to the traditional field of ethics. 
However, Levinasian account on the matter can be taken as a clear foundation by 
understanding his line of argument and the structure of his whole philosophy 
 
The distinctive characteristic of ethics in Levinasian Philosophy is established in the 
self’s relation with the Other. The ethical relationship with the other must always be a 
relationship of non-totalization. What this means is that the Other is beyond one’s 
power both cognitive and physical and one should not attempt to dominate the other 
in any way either by conceptualizing or killing him. One cannot understand, grasp or 
comprehend the Other. Levinas rejects any attempt to dominate the other. He says 
that “the other whose exceptional presence is inscribed in the ethical impossibility of 
killing him in which I stand, marks the end of powers.”36 The Other limits my powers 
because it overflows any idea I have of him. Any attempt taken to comprehend the 
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Other means destruction of the other. It is a violation and negation of the Other. One 
can comprehend only entities, tools, instruments, object. The Other is beyond them 
all.  
 
The Other cannot be possessed. One does not have freedom to determine the Other.  
The very intention of killing someone means that the other as Other is already 
destroyed. I cannot kill him as there is no Other further. Levinas in practice does not 
say that there is an impossibility of killing someone, but the idea of killing someone 
itself destroys what that person is. He puts it this way:  
 
At the very moment when my power to kill is realized, the Other has 
escaped. In killing, certainly I can attain a goal, I can kill the way I hunt, 
or cut down trees, or slaughter animals-but when I have grasped the 
other in the opening of being in general, as an element of the world in 
which I stand. I have seen him on the horizon. I have not looked at him 
straight.37   
 
What Levinas is saying is that, for real relationship to exist between the self and the 
other, it must of itself exclude killing and conceptualization. A real relationship must be 
done in a face to face approach. A face to face relationship is a relationship of dialogue 
and not of violence. This dialogue has to be open and not with a preconception since 
the other possesses an infinite spontaneity. It is real relation between a being and a 
being.  
                                                 
37




For Levinas, human  beings are thinking-beings. Thinking beings cannot be categorized 
in any totality. If one conceptualizes a thinking-being, he does violence to him. 
Conceptualization rejects the radical alterity of the other. Only unthinking-beings can 
be subsumed in a totality.   
 
In traditional ethics, the idea of responsibility rests on the idea of rationality or 
freedom.  Levinas rejects freedom as a product of rationality. He maintained that 
defining or justifying freedom in this way will only lead to its subsumption in an 
impersonal will, hence a totalization. For Levinas then, ethics is metaphysical.   This 
means that ethics is not based on the notion of freedom but rather on the notion of  
Desire-for-Other. This implies Desire for Goodness.  However, this goodness is not any 
fulfillment of one’s conceptual need. This goodness emerges within a subject Desiring 
to assist the Other. He says that:    
 
To be for the Other is to be good. The concept of the Other has, to be 
sure, no new content with respect to the concept of I: but being for the 
Other is not a relation between concepts whose comprehension would 
coincide, or the conception of  a concept by an I, but my goodness. The 
fact that in existing for another I exist otherwise than in existing for me 
is morality itself.38 
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This portrays the fact that Levinas was not interested in establishing a normative ethics  
but rather a metaphysical one. However, positing an ethics against natural-will, that is 
against one’s volition, one’s rational choice, and capacity, changes the role of 
responsibility. This responsibility is not guided by the intention of a rational human 
being.  Therefore, this account does not firstly consider an agent’s power to attribute 
responsibility. In traditional ethics, I ought to do X implies that I can do X but 
Levinasian account do not employ this model of responsibility where the self or 
individual is answerable only to that which is in his or her power. This can be said to be 
a deterministic ethics. Rejecting this ethics will only give an agent a bad conscience. In 
other words “even if I deny my primordial responsibility to the other by affirming my 
own freedom as primary, I can never escape the fact that the other has demanded a 
response from me before I affirm my freedom not to respond to his demand. Ethical 
freedom is, heteronymous freedom obliged to the other.”39   
 
The idea of bad conscience in Levinas does not mean the same in traditional ethics. 
Bad conscience in traditional ethics does not come about by  rejecting responsibilities 
that are impossible for one to fulfill rather it comes about by one knowing that he can 
fulfill such responsibility but ignores it. Commenting on Levinas idea of responsibility 
and good conscience, Robert Bernasconi says: 
 
Most traditional ethical systems reject any such multiplication of my 
responsibilities on the grounds that it is destructive of good conscience. 
Traditional ethical philosophies also have no place for Levinas’s 
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insistence that one is responsible even for what took place before one 
was born. They would see Levinas as extending the concept of 
responsibility to the point that one’s sense of responsibility for what is 
within one’s power is diminished.40 
 
Levinasian ethics necessarily implicates the idea of God. For the other to have a moral 
priority over me means that such a responsibility could not have come from my 
initiative. It must come from something higher, something beyond nature. For Levinas , 
morality comes as the voice of God. In his words, “… the moral priority of the other 
over myself could not come to be if it is not motivated by something beyond nature. 
The ethical situation is human situation, beyond human nature, in which the idea of 
God comes to mind.”41   
 
If the ethical relationship is metaphysical, one may be inclined to think that the 
relation has nothing to offer to the self. The self does not become responsible with 
nothing to gain. The face to face relationship yields something for the self namely 
truth. It means that “Truth is sought in the other, but by him who lacks nothing.”42 The 
self by entering into a communication with the other starts to share the world of the 
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 2.3  Desire and the Face 
 
The metaphysical desire of the self tends towards the other in order to share his world 
and gain the truth about him. The Desire for the other stimulates me to welcome the 
other accepting his world as it is. The Other presents himself to me through a medium 
which Levinas refers to as the face. In other words, the face connotes how the Other’s 
alterity conveys or presents himself. The face is not how I conceive the Other’s face or 
how I categorize it in my concepts. It is a kind of notion that could not be understood 
by confining it to language or ideologies. Levinas says that this manner of presentation 
named the face exceeds how one can think of the other. He says that “the way in 
which the other presents himself, exceeding the idea of the other in me, we here 
name face.”43  
 
Again by using the term face as a mode of presentation, Levinas does not only refer to 
the literal face of the human being. The whole being and actions of the person play the 
same role as the face. He says that the face is not a mere part of a subject but a whole 
that expresses its totality. The whole of the body expresses the face.  “And the whole 
body- a hand or a curve of the shoulder- can express as the face.”44 However, a dead 
person is no longer a face. He holds that “the dead face becomes a form, a mortuary 
mask…precisely no longer appears as a face.”45 
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The face, being a mode of presentation, possesses language. It speaks, its very 
manifestation is discourse itself. It can come every moment and from every direction. 
The very epiphany of the face expresses something. And the first and primordial 
language of the face is “You shall not commit murder.”46 This is the very signification of 
the face. The face speaking to me also glances at me. This glance is a persuasion to 
react. The glance of the Other prompts me to respond, to express myself and go for 
him and give him the whole of what I have and what I can.  This means that the 
questioning glance of the other seeks my reaction. It is seeking for a meaningful 
response, in that case I must be ready to put my world into words, and to offer it to 
him.  
 
In the attempt to respond to the face, the I cannot objectify him since it comes prior to 
reflection. It instructs and orders me. This dual expression of the face as command and 
summons affects me before I can begin to reflect. I can only approach the face in the 
most basic form of responsibility. The relation with it is always that of rectitude and 
such rectitude consists in my giving.  In the words of Levinas: 
 
This gaze that supplicates and demands, that can supplicate only 
because it demands, deprived of everything because entitled to 
everything, and which one recognizes in giving… this gaze is precisely 
the epiphany of the face as a face. The nakedness of the face is 
destituteness. To recognize the Other is to give. But it is to give to the 
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master, to the lord, to him whom one approaches as “You” in a 
dimension of height.47   
 
Of course Levinas understands that one can ignore the gaze of the stranger, the other 
who asks me not to let him die alone, as if to do so were to become an accomplice in 
his death, the widow, and the orphan. But it does not discount the fact that either in   
giving or in refusing, my recognition passes necessarily through the interposition of 
things. However, refusing on its own leaves me with a bad conscience. As he puts it 
“Even though we are ontologically free to refuse the other, we remain forever 
accused, with a bad conscience.”48   
 
The kind of relationship that Levinas promotes then is a relationship of frankness, of 
genuine conversation with the other. This kind of conversation conserves the integrity 
of the subject and the infinity of the other. However, the subject who is being 
summoned by the face to engage in a frank discussion that is to embody his world in 
expression to the other can also engage in an injustice. Here Levinas specifically refers 
to rhetorics as a kind of injustice. Rhetorics is an act of deception. In rhetorics, the 
subject approaches the other, not to face him, that is not to present his world as it is. 
In other words, the self can engage in a lie. Of course, Levinas say this is also 
conversation but it is a corruption of freedom.49 This corruption of freedom is in 
another sense a conceptualization since the self does not allow the other to present 
himself as he is in a veritable conversation. He is only making the other an object. This 
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means that it is only objects that can be lied to. Levinas here maintains that the human 
being is ontologically a truth teller and someone who should be told the truth.    
 
In contrary to rhetoric which is a ruse, the subject is expected to engage in a truthful 
relationship with the other. This truth consists in letting the other be as the other, 
since “the other qua other is the Other.”50  Conversation therefore ought to be a pure 
disclosure, that is a face to face approach in conversation. This pure conversation with 
the other is the foundation of society. Society as Levinas says does not proceed from 
the contemplation of truth, where truth is understood as an absent or other-worldly 
reality. Truth consists in that pure revelation and reciprocity of the self and the other. 
This is the connection between truth and justice.  
 
Truth, that is allowing the other to be as he or she is, is the foundation of worthy social 
relations and only in this situation can a society be said to be just.  Justice on its own 
refers to the equality of people. And Levinas sees equality as the pure revelation of the 
self and the other without lie, that is without a pre-conceived idea of what the other is. 
He says: 
 
 Equality among persons means nothing of itself; it has an economic 
meaning and presupposes money, and already rests on justice – which, 
when well-ordered, begins with the Other. Justice is the recognition of 
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his privilege qua Other and his mastery, is access to the Other outside of 
rhetoric, which is ruse, emprise, and exploitation.51  
 
Truth teaches. By allowing the other to be a pure other in my conversation with him, I 
subscribe to truth and to an unending means of knowledge since the truth coming 
from the language of the face is already teaching.  The alterity of the other teaches 
me. It is supposed to be very peaceful and there should be no limit to this relation as 
limitation is a feature of totality. The relation of the same and the other cannot be 
brought into a totality.  
 
The absolute value Levinas puts on the human being is shown in his analysis and any 
relationship that will exist between the subject and the other must take this into 
consideration. He actually connects the idea of the face and its relationship with the 
subject to the idea of God. He says that the dimension of the divine opens forth from 
the human face. The face is seen as a reflection of God and justice rendered unto men 
is already a co-relation with God, since God cannot be seen face to face. In his words: 
  
God rises to his supreme and ultimate presence as correlative to the 
justice rendered unto men. The direct comprehension of God is 
impossible for a look directed upon him, not because our intelligence is 
limited, but because the relation with infinity respects the total 
Transcendence of the Other without being bewitched by it, and because 
our possibility of welcoming him in man goes further than the 
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comprehension that thematizes  and encompasses its object. It goes 
further, for precisely it thus goes into infinity. The comprehension of 
God taken as participation in his sacred life, an allegedly direct 
comprehension, is possible, because participation is a denial of the 
divine, and because nothing is more direct than the face to face, which 
is straightforwardness itself. A God invisible means not only a God 
unimaginable, but a God accessible in justice. Ethics is the spiritual 
optics.52 
 
In conclusion then, one can say that in Levinasian philosophy, the Other invokes the 
subject to transcend its interiority. The face expresses its message. The subject is 
commanded and ordered to respond to the face.  The face who is spontaneous, 
possesses no history, breaks up any pre-conceived system.  It comes and hits suddenly 
and thus, the subject does not have time to comprehend its structure nor reflect but 
just to act in responsibility which consists in giving. Nothing summarizes Levinas aim of 
hospitality and pluralism than the following words: 
 
No human or interhuman relationship can be enacted outside of 
economy; no face can be approached with empty hands and closed 
home. Recollection in a home open to the Other- hospitality- is the 
concrete and initial fact of human recollection and separation; it 
coincides with the Desire for the Other absolutely transcendent…But 
the separated being can close itself up in its egoism, that is, in the very 
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accomplishment of its isolation. And this possibility of forgetting the 
transcendence of the Other—of banishing with impunity all hospitality 
(that is, all language) from one’s home, banishing the transcendental 
relation that alone permits the I to shut itself up in itself—evinces the 
absolute truth, the radicalism, of separation.53   
                                     
 
Summary of the Chapter 
 
1. The ground for desire in Levinasian philosophy is primarily the self and the Other. 
 
2. The self who exists in subjectivity—though not solipstic—through enjoyment and 
nourishment finds out that there are others who can interfere with his or her 
enjoyment. 
 
3. These others are not needs in the sense that they can be used to fill a void. They 
are objects of desire. 
 
4. These others defy whatever concepts I can put forth to understand them, hence 
they possess a radical alterity. They are simply, an Other, a transcendent. 
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5. It then means that to understand this Other, I must enter into a face to face 
relationship with him or her. And to be true and just I must approach this object of 
desire with no preconception of what he is or what I want to do to him 
 
6. In communication with this object of desire—the Other—the self encounters a 
facial expression, an expression that is primarily ethical. The primordial expression 
of the face which is ethical is “You shall not commit murder.” 
 
7. The relationship of the self and the Other is a relationship of responsibility which 



















3.0 PERSONALITIES AND DESIRE MANIFESTATIONS IN BUDDHISM 
 
Desire is one of the fundamental concepts of Buddhism. It plays a major role in the 
central Buddhist philosophical formula, dependent co-origination. Irrespective of the 
fact that Buddhism stresses the need for desire eradication,54 it admits its need in 
leading a meaningful worldly life. Various terms are used in Buddhism to denote the 
meaning of desire; i.e., sensual pleasure (kma), craving (tah), lust (rga), desire ( 
chanda,), greed (lobha), grasping/ clinging/ attachment (updna), and, desire for 
sensual pleasure. These terms operate interchangeably where they overlap in 
meaning. In addition there are other terms that convey different levels and degrees of 
desire in canonical and post canonical texts. It is interesting to note that all these 
terms signify diverse levels of desire in a person. 
 
Eradication of craving (tah) is categorically emphasized in Buddhism. The very 
definition of the final-liberation (nibbna) refers to the eradication of craving, hatred 
and delusion (confusion).55 Emancipation is prescribed, in Buddhism, as the lasting 
solution to continuous life-circles and all the troubles that come with it. Despite 
Buddhism’s concern over eradication of mental dispositions, it acknowledges the value 
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of human-happiness (sukha) as one of the most significant aspect of mundane as well 
as emancipated lives.  One’s comprehension of the true nature of life and the world 
leads him/her to contentment according to the Buddhist teachings. However, 
Buddhism advocates that lasting happiness, which is considered as the bliss of the life 
(nibbna), cannot be achieved via the provision of sensual- pleasures. Realization of 
how things come to be and what are the causes and effects of life would pave the way 
to a life of contentment. 
 
As a whole, Buddhism categorizes human beings into three groups: fully-enlightened 
ones, enlightenment-seekers and ordinary human beings.  This division is done in 
relation to the notion of emancipation. The skills and the extent of these three groups’ 
dedication for others’ wellbeing depend on their spiritual position. Thus, 
understanding desire in Buddhism is based on the following three titles, which would 
illustrate the nature of desire in Buddhism as a whole.  
 
           Diversity of desire in early Buddhism/ mundane personality 
Desire of an enlightenment-seeker (of Bodhisatta) 







3.1 Diversity of Desire in early Buddhism/ Mundane Personality 
 
Desire is a vastly discussed and differently interpreted term in Buddhism. Any of the 
central teachings of Buddhism is not detached from the notion of desire. The basic 
teachings like, Dependent Co-origination, Emancipation, Five Aggregates, The Four 
Noble Truth, and even the teachings related to conduct of ordinary people are just 
some of many examples. Early Buddhism uses variety of terms to denote desire, terms 
like tah, kma, raga, updna, chanda are employed interchangeably and sometimes 
they overlap in meaning. The complexity of the meaning regarding this concept is 
captured by Mrs. Rhys Davids when she said: 
 
A comparison of the translations made by such scholars as Burnouf, 
Foucaus, Max Muller, Fausboll, Oldenberg, and Warren with the 
originals, discloses the striking fact that the one English word ‘desire’ is 
made to duty for no less than seventeen Pali words.56  
 
The dynamic nature of the concept in Buddhism can be illustrated by pointing out the 
amount and the variety of terms used in the early canons and later texts to refer to it. 
 All the aspects related to desire is categorized into three in early Buddhism: greed 
(lobha) , hatred (dosa), confusion (moha) (rga, dvesa, and moha in Sanskrit). All of 
them are generally identified as unwholesome as they will generate impurities in a 
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person. Furthermore, Buddhism emphasizes the necessity of eradicating craving, 
hatred and delusion (confusion), in order to attain  emancipation (nibbna). 57 It is 
apparent that the concept of desire is given a negative connotation in relation to 
emancipation in Buddhism.  
 
3.1.1  Desire in Dependent Co-origination (paiccasamuppda) 
 
The Dependent Co-origination is the central doctrine of Buddhism, which distinguishes 
Buddhism from two extreme teachings of contemporary religious philosophies such as 
eternalism and nihilism. Buddha‟s own claim on this doctrine illustrates its paramount 
importance: “one who sees the dependent co-origination sees the dhamma and one who 
sees the dhamma sees the dependent co-origination.”58  This teaching presents the 
Buddhist analysis of reality. According to this teaching, all phenomena are dependently 
originated. This doctrine posits a twelve-fold dependence. The following canonical 
explanation provides a simple and clear picture of twelvefold dependent co-origination.  
Way of continuance: 
 
On ignorance depend disposition; on dispositions depends 
consciousness, on consciousness depends the psychophysical 
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personality; on the psycho-physical personality depend the six 
‘gateways’; on the six ‘gateways’ depends contact; on contact depends 
feeling; on feeling depends craving; on craving depends grasping; on 
grasping depends becoming; on becoming depends birth; on birth 
depend aging and death. In this manner, there arises this entire mass of 
suffering.  
 
Way of ceasing: 
 
On the cessation of ignorance dispositions cease; - on the cessation of 
birth ceases aging and death. In this manner, this entire mass of 
suffering ceases. 59  
 
To understand the Buddhist notion on reality, one has to comprehend the 
interdependency and interrelatedness of every phenomenon. With regard to this 
formula, the aspects of reality (subject- object relation or the human beings and their 
objective-world) are closely related to various causes and factors. Moreover, this 
teaching presents a theory of multiple conditions of both mental and external 
occurrences. It proposes multiplicity or plurality of causes.  Any process is to be 
analyzed based on various causes and factors. Following this doctrine, the idea of a 
single cause or first cause is rejected in Buddhism. 
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This doctrine is said to have four great characteristics such as, (i) objectivity (tathat), 
(ii) necessity (avitatat ) (iii) invariability (anaat) and (iv) conditionality 
(idappaccayat).  The first characteristic indicates that it is not a mental fabrication or 
a mere theory to explain the phenomenal world. The second aspect explains the 
regularity of the process of causation. The third, invariability means that there is no 
constant between the causes and effects.  The principle of cause and effect accounts 
for the uniformity experienced in nature and the predictability of future events. And 
the fourth, conditionality simply means that there is more than one condition 
operative in the process of causation.60  
 
Desire in the doctrine of dependent co-origination is based on the notion of sensuality. 
Kma (sensuality) can be taken as the umbrella term used to signify all sorts of desires 
in Buddhism. An analysis of sensuality gives a clear picture of the role of craving and 
grasping in dependent co-origination. The concept of sensuality is systematically 
analyzed in the Pli scriptures. According to Buddhism, happiness should be sought 
wherever it is available. Accordingly, sense-pleasure is recognized as a kind of 
happiness (sukha, assāda) and sensual lust is a deep-seated psychological 
characteristic of human beings.  
 
In certain discourses, sense pleasure is defined in terms of six senses and their 
corresponding objects.  While in others it is divided into two. They are as follows: 
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1. Objective:  pleasantness, pleasure-giving characteristic, an object of sensual 
enjoyment 
2. Subjective:  (a) enjoyment, pleasure on occasion of sense contact, (b) sense-
desire 
 
The two fold division appears in the Mahāniddesa that is, desire for objects (vatthu 
kma) and subjective desire (kilesa kma).61 A more logical classification is given by 
Dhammapala in the commentary to Vimnavatthu. He classifies it as follows: 
 
i. manapiya rupdi-visaya (pleasant objects)  
ii. chandarga (impulsive desire),  
iii. sabbasmi lobha (greed for anything)  
iv.  gmadhamm (sexual lust)  
v.  hitacchand62 (effort to do good)  
vi. seribhava (self-determination)63  
 
Early Buddhism has listed different kinds of pleasures or happiness. In the list given in 
the Anguttara Nikaya, it is mentioned that there are two kinds of pleasure, one is 
sensual pleasure generally associated with the lay community as indicated in the 
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expression “the white-clad laymen, enjoying sensual pleasures”64 and the other is the 
pleasure of giving up.65   
 
Human beings derive pleasures from the six senses and are therefore pleasure is 
connected to sense perception. Early canons present in detail how the sensory process 
produces desire in the human mind on a causal basis. According to the Samyutta 
Nikya Nidna-vagga, the six senses are conditioned by mind (nma) and form (rupa) 
that are proper to them. For instance, sight is conditioned by the eye. The 
Madhupinikasutta presents the perception process as follows: 
 
Dependent on the eye and forms, eye-consciousness arises. The 
meeting of these three is contact. With contact as condition there is 
feeling.66 
 
Even though the process continues, it is necessary to explain that the term feeling 
(vedan)  is the most affective psychological experience. It may be useful to refer to 
the observation made on feeling by D.J. Kalupahana: 
 
The inevitable result of contact (passa) is feeling (vedan), which 
introduces the emotive element, and this can be pleasant, unpleasant, 
or neutral. Familiarity breeds not only contempt but also admiration 
and indifference. For the Buddha, the emotive aspect of sense 
                                                 
64
 Walshe, Mourice (trans.)., The Long Discourses of the Buddha: A Translation of the Dgha Nikya,   
(Boston: Wisdom Publication, 1995). P.  429. (Hereafter LDB is used to refer this.) 
65
 MLDB., P. 180 
66
 MLDB.,  p. 203 
49 
 
experience is most important, instead of leaving them as arbitrary 
decisions unrelated to the factual world. However, the Buddha was not 
unaware that feelings can grow into monstrous forms, overwhelming 
human beings to such an extent that they lose all rationality. In other 
words, emotions, which are inevitable elements in our experiences, can 
also cause most of our confusion and suffering. 67 (Italics mine) 
 
The problem of the circles of life (samsra) in Buddhism is explained as a consequence 
of the activity of the psychological roots of tah  (craving) and avijj (ignorance).68 
While ignorance functions as the very basic factor of binding the individual into the 
round of existence, craving is the manifestation of the mind that is governed by 
ignorance.69 The way craving and ignorance collaborate to produce pleasant and 
unpleasant feelings that come to affect the individual is explained in the following 
passage:  
 
Monks, for the unenlightened person, hindered by ignorance and 
fettered by craving, this body has thereby originated. So there is body 
and external name and form: thus this dyad. Dependent on the dyad 
there is contact. There are just sense bases and through their contact–
or through the contact of a certain one among them- the fool 
experiences pleasure and pain.70  
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In this discourse, the Buddha states that since the unenlightened person did not 
abandon ignorance and did not utterly destroy craving, with the breakup of the body, 
he passes on to another body whereby he becomes exposed to suffering of birth, aging 
and death, and will not be free from sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and 
despair.71 From this description, it becomes clear that craving and ignorance lie at root 
of the psychological process by which a person becomes subject to rebirth and 
consequently becomes a victim to the whole mass of suffering.  
 
Buddhism states that attachment to sensual gratification is a serious hindrance to the 
individual aspiring to attain enlightenment. Sakka, the lord of gods, once asked the 
Buddha why certain beings do not attain emancipation in this very life while others do. 
In response, the Buddha says: 
  
There are, lord of the gods, forms, cognizable by the eye, sounds 
cognizable by the ear, smells…, tastes…, touches…, and mental 
phenomena cognizable by the mind that are desirable, lovely, 
agreeable, pleasing, sensually enticing, tantalizing. If a monk seeks 
delight in them, welcomes them, and remains holding to them, his 
consciousness becomes dependent upon them and clings to them. A 
monk with clinging does not attain emancipation. If a monk does not 
seek delight in them, does not welcome them, and does not remain 
holding to them, his consciousness does not become dependent upon 
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them or clinging to them. A monk without clinging attains 
emancipation.72 
 
The entire teaching of the Buddha intends to reveal the fact that there is no 
permanent self as the contemporary Indian eternalists asserted and this is the purpose 
of the doctrine of five aggregates.73  
 
In a discourse to the elder Rhula, the Buddha clarified why it is wrong to have the idea 
of self. He asked Rhula: 
 
What do you think; Rhula is the eye permanent or impermanent?”- 
“Impermanent venerable sir”.-“Is what is impermanent, suffering or 
happiness?”-“Suffering venerable sir”- “Is what is impermanent, 
suffering and subject to change fit to be regarded thus: ‘This is mine, 
this I am, this is my self’?”- “No, venerable sir.”74 
 
In effect, the psychological aspect of a human personality is composed of feeling, 
perception, volitional formations and consciousness and the sense-contact is the 
condition for this psychological aspect. The argument outlined here is that if the very 
bases of sense-contact, the internal and external senses are impermanent, how then 
can we claim the permanence of a psychological entity?  
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The existence of the senses and the consequent psychological process they involve are 
not considered evil in themselves. As Citta, a house holder once said, the senses are 
not evil but when they are connected with consciousness which is the result of 
volitional activities, there arises a mental condition which produces wrong perceptions 
of things that do not really exist.  
 
Early Buddhist psychology is concerned with mental tendencies that function as 
hindrances to the emancipation resulting in tendencies to hold on to existence. Among 
those tendencies, longing, hatred, and confusion are recognized as unwholesome 
roots (akusala mulni) in many places in the canon.75 All the evil actions find their basis 
in these three psychological roots. Confusion represents the idea of a permanent self 
and ‘ego concept’ whereby desire is produced to gratify the “I”. The wish to gratify the 
‘I’  is called craving or desire.  
 
The Dvedhvitakkasutta presents a three line of thinking in which sensual desire is 
placed at the beginning. They are as follows: 
 
i. Kmavitakka (sensual desire) 
ii. Vypdavitakka (thoughts of ill-will) 
iii. Vihimsvitakka (thoughts of cruelty).76  
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These three are explained as conducive to the continuation of existence .The three 
opposite lines of thinking are: 
 
i. Nekkhamma (thoughts of renunciation) 
ii. Avyapda (thoughts of non ill will) 
iii. Avihims  (thoughts of non cruelty) 
These are conducive for the cessation of suffering 
 
In Buddhist Psychology, the concepts of sava (cankers/influxes) and anusaya (latent 
tendencies) are representative of deep-lying tendencies in human psyche. The savas 
remain until the practitioner realizes the super knowledge of destruction of cankers 
(savkkhayañana). In the Anguttara Nikya, it is mentioned that if one’s mind is not 
stained by the five hindrances (pañcanivaranni), it could promote concentration that 
leads to the destruction of cankers (savas),77 with the further possibility of gaining 
enlightenment (arahantship). The ordinary or mundane person seeks the aversion of 
pain and delights in sensual pleasure. In seeking pleasure, there lies an underlying 
tendency to lust for pleasant feeling (rgnusaya). He or she does not understand the 
feelings as characterized by its origin and passing away, as well as the danger its 
gratification involves. 
 
From this short reference made to Buddhist psychological explanation, it is clear that 
sensual desire is understood as a deep-rooted psychological phenomenon. In effect, 
not having the right understanding of reality is the ground for this problem of craving. 
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Misperception occurs due to the lack of right understanding. It prevents the person 
from having a right attitude to sensual objects and the experience related with them. 
In other words non-recognition of impermanence acts as the force of this 
misunderstanding. Thus ignorance functions as a hindrance to seeing things as they 
are. 
 
3.1.2  Desire as a Need for a Balanced Moral Life 
 
Buddhism teaches that human beings necessarily inherit vivid mental elements. These 
elements are neither seen as good nor evil, wholesome or unwholesome. Desire as 
one of the affective psychological experiences plays a vital role in one’s personality. 
Moreover for Buddhism desire is only a single cause among many causes of the life-
process. Most human actions are motivated by one or more kinds of mental roots. 
Desire for living, desire for one’s relatives, and desire for other external objects or 
mental satiability are identified as essential elements of one’s life and extremes are 
never advocated in Buddhism. However, early Buddhism stresses the negative sense of 
sensuality with the aim of strengthening the celibate’s mind to remain in the spiritual 
pursuit of leaving the circles of life (samsra). In spite of this emphasis put on the 
spiritual aspect and ill–effect of sensuality, the need and significance of desire for a 




Buddhism is based on the middle path, that is, refusing extreme attitudes and guiding 
the world realistically.  So, it never denies the essential elements of the individual. 
Sensuality is among those basic elements. Moreover, the Buddhist Karma theory is 
based on activities taking place within the realm of sensuality.  Thus it is inevitable to 
have discussions on both negative and positive aspects of it, on a moral basis. In fact, a 
considerable number of discourses investigating the various facets related to 
sensuality have been included in the canonical materials. As for the lay community, 
they wish to lead their life smoothly and enjoy worldly pleasures expected by any 
ordinary person. To have such wishes is not considered wrong or sinful. In accordance 
with common worldly needs and wishes, the Buddha preached the dhamma (his 
teaching) for the well-being of people who desired sensuality. 
 
The Kmasutta in the Sutta Nipta states that the sentient being becomes happy by 
achieving what he or she wishes.78 It is a universal truth that man longs for pleasure. 
The source of pleasure can be located in the psycho-physical make-up of an individual 
which is derived through the six senses. Frequent reference is made to the five senses, 
eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body. These being in contact with external objects, 
generate sensations which are of three kinds: happy, unhappy and neutral. In early 
Buddhist Psychology, this is explained by the term ‘vedan’79 (feeling). The Path to 
purification makes several allusions to the term sukha (happiness). The first is that 
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“pleasure is embedded in the aggregate of feeling.’80 A definition says that “it is a kind 
of pleasant contact.81 What is pleasurable is desired by the individual more and more. 
In certain contexts, pleasures of lay persons and those who have renounced are 
mentioned.82 Sensuality aims at obtaining both physical and mental pleasures. 
Sometimes happiness of the mind is considered superior to physical pleasure.83 
 
To obtain whatever is wished for, is a common psychological character in the mind of 
an earthly being, though most of such wishes become mere fantasies in the realistic 
world. But in the divine world, such ability too, seems to be enjoyed by certain gods. 
The category of goddesses called ‘Manpakyika’ (fairies of lovely form) declare to 
venerable Anuruddha that they have power in the three domains of assuming any 
colour desired, producing any sound desired, and obtaining any kind of happiness 
desired.84 In the Anguttara Nikya, the Buddha states that a woman can go to the 
union with manpakayikdevas (fairies of lovely form) following eight virtuous 
qualities in the present life. The dance performed by these denizens in the presence of 
elder Anuruddha, is given as a live concert in the scripture.85 When we examine the 
three domains possessed by these fairies, colour, sound and pleasure. We see that 
they are essential in pleasing one’s mind and they are part of fivefold sensual element 
(pañcakmaguna). Enjoyment of such pleasures has been approved and even the 
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avenues to achieve them are given in the discourse. This shows that in early Buddhism, 
while there is a soteriological blue print in its major project for the world, that is, 
transcending sensuality, it also leaves room for certain kinds of pleasure with certain 
forms of ethical control. 
 
The ethical teachings expounded by the Buddha for the stability of the institute of the 
family validate the necessity of sensual life in the mundane world. The family is 
considered as the fundamental institution established in society to lead a legal sensual 
life in human civilization. The person who wishes to lead a religious life has to abandon 
his family as a symbol of renouncing sensuality. Siddhatta did this prior to his spiritual 
investigation as reported in the Pli canon.86 In contrast to this type of rare cases, the 
vast majority of people seek pleasure within the family itself. So, the Buddha preached 
several discourses to maintain its well-being and in order to improve its quality. The 
discourse Siglovada is an authentic example for such teachings found in the Pli 
canon.87 
 
Depicting an ideal image of the woman-treasure (itthiratana), the canonical writer says 
that she surpasses human beauty without reaching divine beauty. Apart from 
considering the woman-treasure as an object of beauty possessing all desirable 
physical attributes,88 it is of interest to note certain qualities enumerated in particular 
to emphasize sensual aspects of the woman-treasure, thereby evaluating the woman-
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treasure particularly through her sexual qualities. Qualities found in her in respect to 
tactile sensation are described to be of highest sensual effect. “The touch possessed by 
her is such that it is like a tuft of kapok or a tuft of cotton-wool. When it is cool, her 
limbs are warm; when it is warm, her limbs are cool.”89 “While her body permeates the 
scent of sandalwood, the mouth spreads the scent of lotuses.”90 Making an 
observation on this portrayal of the woman-treasure L.P.N. Perera says that a 
significant characteristic of such descriptions is the emphasis given to the sensual 
aspect of a woman.91 
 
The concept of craving (tah) is concerned with the idea of sensuality and it is a basic 
inclination of human beings. So, the Buddhist teaching attempts to teach the follower 
how to have a happy sensual life within the limits of morally acceptable behavior. We 
can conclude that Buddhism has a realistic approach towards human nature, accepts 
that sensual pleasures are strong and are enjoyed by sentient beings. 
 
This account is a more plausible view of sensuality irrespective of the widely known 
accusation leveled against Buddhism that it seeks the cessation of sensual pleasures. It 
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3.1.3  Desire as a Drive to Help the Other 
 
It is a widely accepted fact that Buddhism denies the notion of self or a reality that 
ensures self-identity as such. This raises a counter question ‘how can there be a desire-
to-help others if there is no such self-identity? Buddhist ideas of reality clarify this 
issue.  Reality for Buddhism is twofold: conventional and absolute. Persons and 
morality exist in the conventional realm, while in the absolute realm of reality these 
ideas do not make sense.92  In the aforesaid doctrine of dependent co-origination, a 
person is identified as a psycho-physical flux.  Again a person is divided into a fivefold 
process called ‘five aggregates (factors).’ All these factors are changing often and they 
are in a state of flux. The preceding events disappear giving birth to succeeding events. 
Anyone can verify this reality by looking at oneself objectively and introspectively.  
 
Altruistic behavior in Buddhism is possible since it admits continuity of existence 
though it refutes the notion of a permanent self. This aspect is directly related to early 
Buddhist notion of morality. Generosity is clearly identified and well-established as one 
of the wholesome qualities everyone should practice. This behavior is well appreciated 
by both categories of human beings: worldly beings and emancipated beings.  
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Buddhism justifies generosity from different perspectives.  Firstly, from the dependent 
co-origination, the central teaching of Buddhism, others (human beings specially and 
other sentient beings) play an essential role in one’s life. As life is taken as a flux of 
different and multiple conditions, others are an essential and unavoidable factor. In 
this context the other is situated in the centre of one’s life. No one is totally separated 
and independent.  Each and everyone’s life is naturally related to other humans and to 
other beings as well as to nature. There must be a good link between one and the 
others to construct a whole. Thus, it is obvious under the central theory of Buddhism 
that a concern for one’s fellow human beings is a well rooted notion.   
 
Secondly in Buddhism, it is believed that most social tensions, natural disasters and 
personal conflicts occur due to the disregard of the link that should be kept with one’s 
conduct.  An analysis presented in discourse Siglovda regarding human relationship 
with all the members of the society depicts this very clearly. A reciprocal relationship is 
presented here based on the role one plays in a particular society. One’s duty is 
prioritized while less concern is placed on one’s rights. Fulfilling one’s duty would 
automatically imply the safeguarding of one’s right according to Buddhism. One of the 
modern scholars has pointed this interrelatedness out succinctly:  
 
Leaves are usually looked upon as the children of the tree. Yes, they are 
children of the tree, born from the tree, but they are also mothers of 
the tree. The leaves combine raw sap, water, and minerals, with 
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sunshine and gas, and convert it into a variegated sap that can nourish 
the tree. We are all children of society, but we are also mothers. We 
have to nourish the society. If we are uprooted from the society, we 
cannot transform it into a more livable place for us and for our 
children.93  
 
Thirdly, one’s essential link with the society is acknowledged in the criteria of 
wholesome and unwholesome acts. Buddhism emphasizes the idea of wholesome acts 
over unwholesome ones in relation to emancipation. Wholesome roots motivate the 
subject towards moral behavior for the wellbeing of oneself and others. In addition to 
this, there is another reference made in the canons regarding four motives: impulse 
(uncontrolled) or partiality (chanda), hatred (dosa), fear (bhaya), and delusion 
(moha)94  which would lead a person to a biased conduct.  One who is motivated by 
one or more of them will commit unwholesome acts, thus harming him and others. 
Therefore, it is said that one should be very attentive to them in order to control them. 
Cultivation of wholesome mental tendencies generates good conduct in a person, thus 
minimizing harm and maximizing benefits for oneself and others.   
 
The most distinguished teaching regarding the other in Buddhism is found in the fourth 
noble truth (ariya aagika magga).95 It represents the path which is called the 
gradual path, for emancipation. The path is eightfold and it is again divided into three: 
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virtue, concentration and wisdom.  The whole behavior of a Buddhist is expected to 
follow this path. A detailed account of this explains that the whole path is directly 
related to the other. It is taught that enlightenment is attainable through this path 
which culminates in wisdom. However the most significant aspect of this teaching is 
that it is based on the good conduct of the follower. In all the practice the other plays a 
central role.  
 
In Buddhism, all the ethical instructions given regarding the behaviour of the lay and 
recluse are aimed at the other, especially in the noble eight fold path. Right 
understanding is necessary to recognize the value of others lives, to respect them, and 
to help them. This understanding will convince one that his behaviour should bring 
happiness and pleasantry for all. He will then commit to the wellbeing of the world. 
This will produce right thoughts in him. These right thoughts will lead him not to use 
harmful words but pleasant words at others. This will lead him to commit right actions 
by not causing troubles to others but by improving the others’ life conditions. To be in 
this good mode and continue in it, one must have energy. It should be supported by 
right effort in which wholesome thoughts are produced and cultivated while 
unwholesome thoughts are controlled and submerged. To continue this, one must be 
mindful enough and it is done by right mindfulness. The eighth stage is the calm, 




Buddhism appreciates social life and thus responsibility is emphasized. Responsibility 
brings out one’s relation with others, therefore responsibility of every member of 
society is stressed. Shared responsibility is identified as a must for the survival and 
continuance of a peaceful society and less-suffering society.  People who have no 
sense of responsibility for the society or the common good are acting against human 
nature. 96 This entails that people should orient their hearts and minds away from the 
self and go towards alleviating others suffering. Universal responsibility and altruistic 
behavior work hand in hand. Each and every member of the society has a duty to care 
for each member of society. Thus, it is essential to ensure that the sick and the 
afflicted do not feel helpless, rejected, or unprotected. The affection one shows to 
such people demonstrates the measure of one’s spiritual health, both at the level of 
the individual and at that of the society.97   
 
The need for mutual support towards spiritual progress is also an important point in 
the Buddhist appreciation of others. There are two essential factors that support the 
progress of spiritual path. The first is, called critical reflection (yonisomanasikra) 
which is internal while the second is called spiritual friend which   (kalyamittat) is 
external. The Buddha was concerned of both the internal and external factors and 
thereby pointed out the significance of both in the progress of spiritual aspirant along 
the path.  
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It is clear that even the spiritual path is not devoid of other people. Every aspect of 
one’s life from its conception to death is directly related to others. It is clear that one 
could have a desire to do good in the Buddhist context irrespective of the negative 
connotation of desire emphasized in it. To produce good thoughts, to continue those 
thoughts and to put those wholesome thoughts into action can be categorized or seen 
as a desire to do good.  
 
3.2  Desire of an Enlightenment-Seeker (of Bodhisatta) 
 
Originally the term Bodhisatta was used by Gothama Buddha and others to indicate his 
(siddhatha’s) career from his great renunciation to his enlightenment. Later this was 
extended from his conception to his Enlightenment. According to the canonical 
references he spent a very luxurious life as a prince and as a husband.  The great 
renunciation of Siddhattha symbolizes a particular characteristic of a Bodhisatta. The 
very motive of the great renunciation (mahbhinikkhamaa) is social. His aim was to 
find a complete resolution to the problem of discontent in human life.  
 
The claims regarding the causes of the renunciation could be taken as proofs of the 
social motive he had. He was a seeker of wholesomeness (ki kusala gaves 
anuttara santi varapada pariyesamno). He was not seeking an absolute truth 
(paramasacca). Wholesomeness is related to one’s ethical behavior. The term is used 
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in Buddhism as the criteria of ethically good behavior. In this case one’s conduct is 
admitted as ethically good only if it benefits both oneself and the other.98 Any action 
that only benefits oneself or the other is ethically unwholesome. This is the foundation 
of morality. His goal was to produce peace within and peace without.  
 
The term Bodhisatta (in Pali) or Bodhisattva (in Sanskrit) is one of the widely discussed 
and debated concepts. There are several controversial issues related to this concept 
and yet unresolved. Different definitions are given to the concept by various Buddhist 
traditions, depending on their central doctrinal analysis.  Considering the limit of the 
present study I pay less attention to the certain aspects of the definitions of the term, 
i.e., derivation, conceptual differences, and many other aspects. Both early and later 
Buddhists sources discuss this concept. In Encyclopedia of Buddhism99 the term 
Bodhisattva is etymologically divided into two, bodhi and sattva: bodhi, from budh, to 
be awake,  ‘awakening’ or ‘enlightenment’ and sattva, derived from sant, the present 
participle of the root as, ‘to be’, means ‘a being’ or, literally, ‘one who is’, a sentient 
being. This seems to mean ‘one whose essence is Enlightenment’ or ‘enlightened 
knowledge’. It then means that a bodhisatta is a seeker of enlightenment, a Buddha-
to-be.  
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Bodhisatta is limited mostly to Skayamuni Gotama Buddha. The term is used to discuss 
about his previous lives from the day he vowed to become a Buddha after having the 
Buddha Dipankara’s prediction that he will become the future-Buddha. Moreover it is 
used to refer to Siddhatha’s life until the attainment of enlightenment. In addition to 
that there are several references made on a future Bodhisatta named Metteya. 
Moreover according to the Theravda’s view, there can only be one Bodhisatta within 
a particular period. 
 
The most developed form of the Bodhisatta concept in Theravda Buddhism is found in 
texts such as Buddhavasa and Cariypiaka. Here the term Bodhisatta is a being who 
vows to become a perfectly-enlightened Buddha (sammsambuddha), out of 
compassion for other beings, renounces his arahant enlightenment, receives a 
prophesy from the previous Buddhas to become the future Buddha, and fulfills all the 
ten Bodhisatta perfections (pramit). The expression of Sumedha the ascetic, who 
wished to become a future Buddha illustrates that most of the altruistic aspects is 
accounted for in Theravda literature too.  
 
'Should I wish, I could destroy the endless turmoil of existence, and 
become a novice of the Order, and enter the noble city (no. 47). 'What 
use in disguise? By the extinction of sin, I having become a Buddha like 
this Buddha, supreme in the world, will ferry the people in the ship of 
the Law across the ocean of existence, and bring them to the City of 
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Nirvāna, my own happiness being extinguished' (no. 48- 49). The hero, 
the Tathāgata Dīpaṅkara, the one Bridge of the World, the World's one 
Eye, stood at his head, and spoke: 'In time to come, this man shall be a 
supreme Buddha, Gotama by name,' and revealed his disciples, his 
native city, and so forth (No.53-54).100 
 
Thus Bodhisatta in Theravada tradition means a being who aspires to Bodhi 
(enlightenment).101 For this definition it is proper to conclude that the word can be 
used to refer to all those who seeks nibbna including Buddhas, Pacceka-Buddhas, and 
Buddhist disciples. However as afore mentioned the term is generally and mostly used 
to name those beings who seek to be future Buddhas.   
 
Bodhisatta means a state of being enlightened. This is the condition of release from 
endless spiritual fears, cravings, harmful attachments, and distorted perception. The 
term is particularly used for the person who deliberately delays his realization for the 
sake of unenlightened suffering beings while he has everything to attain it. Bodhisattva 
means a Buddha-to-be. He is still here to help others who are caught in the mass of 
suffering. In other words Bodhisatta is the term to denote a truth-seeker102 in 
Buddhism. The ideal Bodhisatta voluntarily renounces his personal emancipation to 
                                                 
100
 Jinacarita:Journal of the Pali Text Society, Vol. V (London: Henry Frowde, 1905). p. 120 
101
 DA., Vol. III. P. 427 
102
 There is a debate on whether an enlightenment-seeker searches for „what is truth‟ or „what is 
wholesome?‟ This issue has emerged due to explanation given in Ariyapariyasena in Middle Length 
Sayings.   This issue is not expected address in this research.  
68 
 
help with the suffering of the other beings.103 Renunciation of one’s own emancipation 
is possible only by a person highly developed in one’s spirituality. Such a person must 
be at the zenith of selflessness according to Buddhist exposition.  
 
A Bodhisatta’s career consists of three stages in the Theravada traditions: Period of 
aspiration, of expression, and of nomination. At the first stage the being who aspires to 
become a Buddha makes a firm mental resolve (mano-panidi). He does it in front of a 
perfect Buddha with the hope of helping the other beings. Secondly he does a verbal 
expression (vaci-panidhi) regarding his resolution in front of the Buddha. Thirdly the 
being with a firm determination and will-power, gradually develops the power of self-
sacrifice in him. He continues this until he reaches the goal of full-enlightenment.  To 
be an effective Bodhisatta, eight prerequisites must be fulfilled: human existence, 
attainment of the male sex, cause, seeing a Teacher, going forth, attainment of the 
special qualities, an act of merit, and will-power [chandat].104  
 
Then the Bodhisatta adheres to the ways of previous Buddhas which is referred to as 
the ten perfections (dasapramit): Giving, morality, renunciation, wisdom, energy, 
patience, truth, resolute- determination, loving- kindness, equanimity.  
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Perfections: Perfection of Giving: 
 
Given the limited space and its direct relation to the other, I will discuss only the 
perfection of giving which is one of the ten perfections in Theravada Buddhism. For 
the commentaries and Cariypiaka, perfections are virtues cultivated by a heart filled 
with compassion, guided by reason, utterly indifferent to worldly gain, and unsullied 
by error and all feelings of self-conceit. It is admitted that fulfillment of these ten are 
inevitably important for the achievement of the goal. Thus they are titled ‘things to-be 
done for the Buddhahood’ (buddhakrakadhamma). The whole conduct around these 
ten represents an ethical development of a person in which the other is often taken 
into greater consideration.   
 
Recognizing perfection of ‘giving’ as one of the highest conducts in one’s life clarifies 
the significance given to this concept in Buddhism. Giving is one of the three ways of 
acquiring merit.105 Moreover it is the first of ten meritorious deeds.  Generosity is 
divided into two: giving of material things and giving of advice and spiritual guidance. 
The latter is identified as more valuable.106 The Practice of giving is encouraged with 
two aims. The first of them is to bring a person to the climax of giving in which one can 
renounce everything, abandon craving for possessions, and give things to others 
compassionately.  The second aim is to build up a positive relation with others while 
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one’s concern for the other is developed. In this explanation, generosity is given 
double value by stressing both its personal and social significance.  
 
‘Giving’ or ‘charity’ is identified as the utmost significant perfection as it guides the 
person to reduce craving which is the most dangerous factor that binds a being in 
continuous existence with troubles. Buddhavasa explaines this “so, seeing 
supplicants, low, high or middling, give a gift completely like the overturned jar.107 One 
can give many things ranging from material things, education, merits and dhamma, 
one’s limbs and life.  
 
This perfection is based on the teaching of the fundamental value of life.  Buddhism 
believes that one’s conduct should be based on the ethics of respecting the value of 
others’ lives. Everyone should regard life as the most precious thing.108 Therefore, it is 
everyone’s fundamental responsibility to refrain from causing harm to another’s life, 
and to give the highest good and happiness to others within his or her reach. One has 
to refrain from harming others ([vritta] negative aspect) and work sympathetically to 
bring about welfare of other beings ([critta] positive aspect). The latter is associated 
with friendly and sympathetic attitude towards others. Giving represents one’s 
sympathy towards the other. 
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Different aspects of giving related to Bodhisatta’s character are numerously depicted 
in Theravda Buddhist literature. The first of them is that he cares only about the need 
of the recipient. If the recipient is in need, the Bodhisatta helps without any 
discrimination or thought regarding the genuineness of the purpose of the recipient. 
However, it is noteworthy that there are places where the Bodhisatta is portrayed as 
being keen on knowing the recipient’s genuine intent. Sometimes, if he finds that the 
intention behind the request is a ruse, he ignores the person. If the purpose is worthy 
enough he offers things the recipient requires. In most of the life stories of the 
Bodhisatta (Jtaka) he is seen as giving what others asked of him without any 
investigation about the recipient’s character or purposes. In that case, he seems to act 
for the sake of action. He expects no reward in return. He does not classify people 
according to their social status when he gives but only cares about the need of the 
recipient.   
 
A Bodhisatta’s generosity is depicted in such a way that he often wishes the happiness 
of others. His concern is to minimize others’ suffering. Once, it was said that Sakka the 
head of the gods, attracted by Bodhisatta’s virtuous life, visited him and asked what he 
expects from him (kanha Jataka [no.440). His desires were: may I harbour no malice or 
hatred against my neighbor, may I not covert my neighbor’s glory, may I cherish 
affection towards others, and may I possess equanimity.   Sakka was disappointed and 
asked what other wishes he has. And then Bodhisatta’s request was:  “O Sakka, … a 
choice thou didst declare: no creature be ought harmed for me, anywhere. Neither in 
body nor in mind; this is my prayer.” In the Mahkapi jtaka, the Bodhisatta is depicted 
72 
 
as a great leader of monkeys, who foreseeing danger to his herd from the kings, 
allowed fellow monkeys to pass safely by treading on his body, stretched as the 
extension of a bridge.109  
 
In addition to this, the Visudddhi Magga points out qualities of Mahsattas (great 
beings),  another term for Bodhisattas, they are concerned about the welfare of living 
beings, not tolerating the sufferings of beings, wishing long duration of life circles to 
the   higher states of happiness of beings and being impartial and just to all beings. To 
all beings they give gifts, which are sources of a pleasure, without discriminating thus, 
‘it must be given to this one; it must not be given to this one’. He practices virtues to 
prevent harm to the others. They have an unshakable resolution towards the welfare 
and happiness of other beings.  
 
3.2.1  The Place of the Other in the Bodhisatta-Vow 
 
Therevda Bodhisatta makes a vow to become a future-Buddha. The content of this 
vow is akin to its Mahayana counterpart.  Here vows of the two traditions are 
presented to show the similarity of the two sects on the concept.  
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May I be the protector of the helpless! May I be the guide of wayfarers! 
May I be `like a boat, bridge, a causeway for all who wish to cross a 
stream]! May I be a lamp for all who need a lamp! May I be a slave for 
all who want a slave! May I be for all creatures a philosopher’s stone 
(cintmani) and a pot of fortune (bhadraghaa), even like unto an 
efficacious rite of worship and a potent medicinal herb! May I be for 
them a wish-fulfilling tree (kalpa-vka) and a cow yielding all that one 
desires (kma denu)!110 
 
In the explicit Theravada’s view, it reads: 
 
What is the use of my crossing over alone, being a man aware of my 
strength? Having reached omniscience, I will cause the world together 
with devs (gods) to cross over [no. 56]). By this act of merit of mine 
towards the supreme among the men I will reach omniscience, I will 
cause many people to cross over [no.57]. Cutting through the stream of 
sasra (circle of life) 
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It seems that in both vows, liberating others is the basic idea underlying them.  
 
3.3  Desire in an Enlightened Personality (of arahant) 
 
Enlightenment is the highest goal the utmost significant achievement of human life for 
early Buddhism. Moreover all Buddhist teachings are directly related to this. The 
enlightened beings are generally divided into three: Samm Sambuddha (perfect 
Buddha), Paccheka Buddha (Silent Buddha), and arahant (enlightened one). In the 
dimension of realization of the truth, all three personalities are equal. They are 
hierarchically positioned due to the nature of certain skills they possess. The perfect 
Buddha is positioned in the highest place as he himself discovers the truth and reveals 
it for the wellbeing of others. Though the silent Buddha also discovered the truth he is 
unable to express the message to the others. The arahant attains enlightenment by 
getting instruction from a perfect Buddha or his doctrine. As all the enlightened 
persons are commonly classified under the concept of arahant, I use this term to refer 
to every enlightened person.  
 
As the nature of enlightenment (nibbna) is complicated, widely discussed, and 
controversial, my discussion will be limited to the scope of the subject. The different 
views presented regarding nibbna as a transcendental experience, a mystical 
experience and a metaphysical notion will not be addressed here. All three persons 
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mentioned above are considered as human beings and nibbna is taken here as 
experiencing the reality of the world. Again, reality represents the notion discussed in 
the account of the dependent co-origination. It seems better to define nibbna as a 
religious experience as it represents the Buddhist notion of emancipation. 
 
The nature of an emancipated person is too complex to elucidate for several reasons: 
firstly the Buddha himself claimed that this subject is not a province (avisay) to speak 
about, secondly he was not interested in answering metaphysical questions regarding 
this sort of metaphysical issues,111 and thirdly the attainment of enlightenment is 
valued rather than making a rational enquiry on it. However, the empirical nature of 
nibbna has been considerably illustrated in certain occasions. Buddhism emphasizes 
the need of examining their post-nibbnic-behavioral changes which occur as a 
consequence undergoing such psychological transformation.  
 
It is necessary to emphasize that early Buddhism does not accept any transcendental 
being or entity in relation to emancipation. Emancipation is not a gift of any other 
immortal being or external phenomena nor does its attainment come from the 
fulfillment of a given prescription in a religion or any other system of thought. This is 
purely understood as a human achievement. Though it is seen as having some special 
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characteristics that are beyond the average human being, it does not presuppose any 
sort of other-worldliness or metaphysical aspect.  
 
The complexity of comprehending the concept of nibbna could be illustrated by 
depicting the range of terms that is used to refer to it. Emancipation is considered in 
canonical texts as “the far shore, the subtle, the very difficult to see, the un-aging, the 
stable, the disintegrated, the unmannifested, the unproliperated, the peaceful, the 
deathless, the sublime, the auspicious, the secure, the destruction of craving, the 
wonderful, the amazing, the unailing state, the unafflicted, dispassion, purity, freedom, 
the unadhesive, the island, the shelter, the asylum, and the refuge….”112  
 
Thus nibbna suggests a peaceful and calm condition and the person with the 
realization should be consistent with these qualities. In other words this refers to a 
particular person who followed an ethical path with effort and achieved the goal of 
happiness and contentment. This is the crux of the Buddhist emancipation. All kinds of 
enlightened beings undergo this particular experience without any difference. It is 
obvious that the aquisition of virtue, concentration, and wisdom (tisikkh) occurs at 
this level. Realizing the four Noble Truth, destruction of all taints (influxes) and 
knowing and seeing them are crucially important. It also occurs to the person that he is 
free from all sorts of bondages and mental grudges which hold him in the sasra.   He 
realizes this new alteration in his personality. The major difference between an 
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enlightened being and worldly ones is that the enlightened persona has abandoned all 
influxes or taints.  
 
The next essential component to point out is ‘seeing and knowing’ one’s emancipation. 
This refers to self introspection. Furthermore, this prevents one from identifying 
emancipation as a mere mystical experience. The change one undergoes is not a 
sudden change due to any external phenomena. The follower has come through the 
threefold discipline (virtue, concentration, and wisdom). This knowledge indicates 
culmination of wisdom and compassion.  One is aware of what occurs in him. It is 
achieved through his practice.  He strives for the goal, follows a prescribed path, his 
mind is sharpened and finally the knowledge is attained.  
 
Emancipation is divided into (a) ‘extinction (of passion) with substratum left’ 
(sopdisesa) and (b) ‘extinction with no rebirth-substratum left’ (anupdhisesa).113 The 
former refers to a living enlightened person. It means release from cravings and 
attachment to life. Moreover, it refers to emancipation (in this very life) with the 
assurance of final death. It is freedom of spirit, calm, and perfect well-being. In other 
words this being still exists and is constituted of five aggregates. However, they are 
spiritually transformed. Extinction (of passion) with substratum left’ (sopdisesa) is the 
focus of this chapter since it is constrained to living enlightened personality. Therefore, 
it needs some clarification. On Buddhagosa’s interpretation, it seems that this 
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personality is still having certain clinging. In other words, he bears aggregates. He is 
conditioned by some phenomena. However, his behavior has undergone a personality 
alteration. Others can observe his conduct and verify whether he is transformed or 
not.  
Some complications arise at this point. A critical question will be what then is Buddhist 
emancipation? Does it refer to attaining a different reality or dimension of reality?  Or 
does it refer to some different way of perceiving and living in this world, the same 
world we usually experience? To my understanding of early Buddhism, it is proper to 
suggest that Buddhist emancipation is a psychological transformation. Any attempt to 
identify it metaphysically ends up in producing transcendental issues and removing its 
pragmatic value. Emancipation cannot be reduced to a mere mystic experience as well. 
It does not create new reality.  On the one hand, it is a change of cognitive process. On 
the other hand, it cannot be reduced merely to a cognitive transformation as it 
transforms the emancipated character and it is said that transmigration terminates 
with it.  Thus, the transformed personality is contented, well-focused on the present, 
and lives in the world without internal or external disputes. 
 
The availability of ‘desire’ does not refer to a strong form of desire such as 
craving/thirsty (taah), grasping/clinging (updna), or greed (lobha). The Buddhist 
idea of desire that applies here is chanda  As I mentioned before one division of desire 
is identified as ‘desire to do good for others’ (hitacchanda). This is also classified into 
two: the first one is about average persons’ desire to do good for others. The second 
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one is about the enlightened person’s desire to do good for others. I will only consider 
the latter here. Moreover, this desire can be differentiated from unwholesome roots 
which generally prevail in an average person.  
 
The enlightened person is symbolically represented as a lotus. This offers the 
symbolical meaning of his character to society. He is born in the society. He lives there 
without clinging into any social defilement like a blooming lotus and makes the world 
beautiful, gives off a fragrance without being polluted by muddy water. Just as a lotus 
germinates in water, grows in water, rises above it and stands unsoiled by it, so does, 
the enlightened person grows up in the world, rises above the world, and stays 
unsoiled by the world.  Mud and dirty water symbolize personal and social defilement. 
This is an example that shows that the nibbanic person does not leave the society that 
means the other. He lives there and acts for the wellbeing of others like a lotus and 
makes the world beautiful. It does not imply that he has transcended all the biological, 
seasonal and any other physical laws. It only means that he has psychically transformed 
himself. This is the uniqueness of such a person. However, he is not concerned with 
gain and lost, fame and shame, blame and praise, happiness and misery.114 He 
experiences the world without being overwhelmed by worldly defilements. This gives 
him the courage and the skill needed to serve the wellbeing of the world. Moreover, 
the compassion he cultivated leads him for others wellbeing.  
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Moral perfection is essentially related to nibbana. Thus, freedom from unwholesome 
mental roots, from all attachments, from all repulsion signifies one aspect of it. On the 
other hand, it is about a state of independence, realism and peace. Morally good 
conduct is inherently related to this state. As the emancipated person undergoes a 
psychical transformation that enables moral conduct to become a personality trait. 
This realization is also used as a perceptual process, a process of introspective 
observation in certain context of the discourses. In the achievement of such goal, one 
has to undergo a process of meditation and some other practices. By introspective 
observation a transformation is noticed to have occurred in perception.  
 
This transformation changes motivations in one’s conduct.  The replacement of 
wholesome roots for unwholesome roots occurs after this change. As a consequence, 
one is stimulated to do good for others. He practices his nibbnic qualities with this 
attainment. In this way the other becomes an essential motivation in the behavior of 
the enlightened person and the enlightened person displays an exemplary character.  
 
The fourth Noble truth, eightfold path, presents the path to enlightenment. However, 
the Buddhist path is not an end in itself, which means that until the final nibbna (final 
death), such a person lives in the society. An enlightened person is not devoid of 
virtues. As he is already transformed, he easily follows the righteous way. Anywhere he 
lives is pleasant and peaceful for him and others.115 Virtue, concentration, and wisdom 
                                                 
115
 DhP., Verse no: 98 
81 
 
are the basis of his conduct. He finds nothing to be attached to and to be repulsive of. 
He needs not now to force himself to be morally good. As he has realized three signata 
(impermanence, suffering, and non-self) his verbal and bodily conduct is wholesome. 
He does not behave in such a way as to produce harm to himself or others.  
 
The emancipated person possesses practical virtues which includes verbal conduct like 
refraining from false speech, malicious speech, harsh speech, idle chatting. Instead he 
acts as a truth-speaker, as a one to be relied on, trustworthy, dependable and not a 
deceiver of others. He is a reconciler of people in enmity and an encourager of those in 
unity, rejoicing in peace, loving it, delighting in it, and as a one who speaks up for  
peace. He speaks whatever is blameless, pleasing to the ear, agreeable, reaching the 
heart, urbane, pleasing and attractive to the multitude. He becomes a speaker whose 
words is to be treasured, seasonable, reasoned, well-defined and connected with the 
goal.116 While preventing killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, taking intoxicants, he 
helps to protect others possessions, helps to continue others family relations, and 
helps others to lead a meaningful life.  
 
Thus, the emancipated person’s conduct necessarily plays a significant role in any 
society as he is never motivated to do harm neither to himself nor to the other. 
However, this does not suggest that the arahant has transcended every principle of 
nature, physical, biological, or psychological. He still functions in a world where the 
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principle of ‘dependent arising’ prevails. Thus he undergoes old age, decay, sickness 
and finally death. 
 
Freedom from the past makes it easy for the arahant to assist others unbiased. The 
other is not discriminated on the ground of past memory or in the Buddhist sense past 
formations. Also, he is not future-goal oriented and he does not wish to misuse others 
for egoistic goals. His conduct is impartial and unbiased. He is troubled by neither 
internal nor external factors which are related to the past, future or present and he is 
driven to act in a most suitable pro-social way. Thus abandoning temporal biases 
makes it easy to help others and work for others. 
 
 The concept of ‘Ideal solitude’ is one of the related concepts to an arahant’s life and it 
has generally being used to misread the arahants’ character as a being who has 
abandoned his social links. It is historically true that some arahants preferred the 
forests to villages or towns. This is a personal attitude not doctrinal. However, majority 
of historical arahants were with the people, tirelessly worked for the spiritual 
wellbeing of the multitude. Hundreds of psalms recited by arahants provide proof for 
this.117 It is incorrect to say that living alone in a forest or somewhere devoid of people 
would essentially make a real noble life. Buddha instructed monks that the ideal 
solitude is not living away from the people or society. It is only a part of solitude, the 
real solitude for him being freedom from all bondages. If one is not free from mental 
obstructions it is improper to claim ideal solitude. Thus Buddha’s emphasis was on 
freedom from attachments rather than being away from the society. ‘ .. What lies in 
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the past has been abandoned, what lies in the future has been relinquished, and desire 
and lust for present forms of individual existence has been thoroughly removed.’118 
This is another aspect which identifies the arahant’s drive for social wellbeing.  
 
To conclude the discussion, the arahant’s drive to help others is symbolically identified 
with a lotus in muddy water. He is psychically transformed, his perception of the world 
is different from other worldly beings.  In other words, the arahant or enlightened 
person is an epitome of compassion. 
 
This discussion, however, raises a question. Has there existed such a person? The 
Bodhisatta Gotama, for early Buddhism, was born as a man, attained enlightenment as 
a man, and consequently passed away as a man. Even after his enlightenment he did 
not introduce himself as any kind of supernatural being. He introduced himself as an 
extra ordinary man. Furthermore, he is a man because according to early Buddhism no 
other beings inhabiting anywhere else (in the six realms other than human world) can 
attain enlightenment. He is neither a theoretical metaphysician nor a materialist.  
 
The historical figure of Sakyamuni Buddha and most of the arahant figures reported in 
Buddhist canons are considered fully emancipated persons. Since the Buddha is the 
first arahant, and all arahants are similar in their major qualities, it is logical to 
consider them in one category. Therefore the word arahant is used here as the 
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common term to refer to both the Buddha and all his enlightened disciples. They all 
are emancipated persons. 
 
Sangha: Formulation of Religious Community of Monks and Nuns  
 
To continue the message of peace, the Buddha formed the community of monks. The 
Sangha, the central community is constituted by the Order of monks and nuns. Indeed, 
it is expressly stated in the Mahparinibbna sutta that the Buddha had resolved not 
to get his final emancipation (final death) until the Order (along with lay followers) was 
firmly established.119 The Order began officially with the conversion of the five 
wanderers who heard the Buddha's first sermon, and had grown substantially over the 
forty-five years of his teaching career.  
 
Going against prevailed social constrains, any one from any of the four castes namely 
Brahmin, Khattiya, Vessa, and Sudda, was allowed to be a member of this spiritual 
community. He once stressed this, “just as the river Gang slops, slants and proceeds 
towards the ocean, so the congregation of Gotama, the laity as well as the monastic, 
slops, slants and proceeds towards Nibbna.”120 The motive of renunciation was 
considered instead of the caste one belonged. The Person who really wished for 
spiritual path and inner peace was encouraged and assisted to follow the right path 
and to attain the goal.121  
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The Buddha’s second large compassionate move is depicted by his attitude towards 
women and act of forming the order of nuns. His attitude towards women marked a 
contrast to the orthodox Brahmins’ view of the contemporary India. Women were 
considerably disregarded and their religious rights also seem to be denied according to 
the cannons and most historians. Buddha’s equal compassion was focused on women 
and they were allowed to lead a spiritual life. But it could not be denied that the 
Buddha was a little suspicious of women according to the Buddhist canons. It is said 
that Buddha did not pay adequate attention to Ananda’s request to permit women to 
enter and lead a religious life. The reply which is said to have come from the Buddha is 
controversial for several reasons.122 I will not admit that the Buddha hesitated to 
permit women’s ordination because of the fact they were women. Therefore, the story 
regarding Buddha’s hesitation in this regard is considered a later Buddhist fabrication 
by those who wanted to keep women away from the religious life. This is not the 
proper place to debate this. Finally, when Ananda asked the Buddha whether a woman 
can attain enlightenment or not? The Buddha’s direct answer is that gender does not 
matter for the spiritual attainment where all the spiritual requirements are fulfilled.123  
Irrespective of traditional attitude towards women, the Buddha was always just and 
kind to them. He was kind even to a harlot124 and saw no wrong in accepting a 
prostitute's invitation to lunch. According to canonical reports thousands of women 
were ordained. Some of them attained final liberation while others continued their 
spiritual life. This was the beginning of women’s religious freedom.   
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Forming the community of monks and nuns signifies a great move from the Buddha. 
This was done due to compassion for others. Though in this present era, this may seem 
to be a simple act, however, it cannot be seen as such as it was a complicated issue to 
transcend contemporary conventional authoritative constrains of the society. Valuing 
egalitarian attitudes and giving it a practical value, by challenging prevailed 
contemporary conventional beliefs in which caste system is valued and fundamental 
human rights denied, is considered necessarily as an action driven by a realistic active 
compassion.  
 
Some Critical Issues Concerning Arahant and Compassion Towards 
Others 
 
Attempting to situate ‘compassion’ in emancipated persons brings out some critical 
issues. To sum up a few of them:  
 
(1) Can detachment (vtarga) and passion act in one personality? How can one be 
moved to assist others’ suffering if the agent is passionless? How can one expect 




It is essential to remember that the discussion is based on the arahants’ existence 
after their psychological transformation.  It then means that most of these issues will 
arise when they are taken out from the actual contexts and put in various 
transcendental categories. Therefore, the discussion should be directly seen through 
early Buddhist sources than mere conceptual analysis.  
 
 (2) Can the arhant be considered as a ‘detached personality’ if he is driven by 
compassion as the later belongs to passion which is opposite of detachment? The 
problem seems plausible in its outlook when compared with the definition given to the 
enlightened person in Buddhism.  Again, the nature of arahant is identified as the 
destruction of all influxes, cankers and unwholesome roots of action. However the 
premise becomes groundless given the cognitive process of an arahant.  However, 
language seems to be a major culprit in this issue. 
 
Viveka and Virga are two of the prominent words used to mean detachment. Though 
both are translated as ‘detachment’ they are unequal in meaning. Viveka primarily 
means separation, aloofness, seclusion and generally physical withdrawal. 
Commentaries present threefold withdrawals: physical withdrawal (kaya viveka); 
mental withdrawal (citta viveka); and withdrawal from the roots of suffering (upadhi 
viveka).  The physical withdrawal is only a supportive element of the spiritual path. For 
the entrance of the path and to build up stability in the path one needs physical 
separation but this does not mean to be away from the society for one’s whole life. 
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One can be in solitude and still have all the unwholesome roots in one’s mind.125 This 
conduct is admitted only if it is linked up with one’s spiritual progress. Again this 
spiritual progress is never identifiable without social relation. Moreover, majority of 
the arahants including the Buddha lived in the society.   
 
The second and third withdrawals represent one’s purification of mind. They are 
related to concept of virga, another concept related to arahnt. Virga means absence 
of all the unwholesome elements of the mind. As mentioned above, lust, desire, and 
craving for sensory pleasure, continuous existence, or any other aspect are classified in 
this category. Therefore, detachment does not mean apathy or indifference to the 
society. It only creates the ground for unbiased and impartial conduct. Consequently, it 
helps to build up good social link. 
 
(3) How can one expect outward compassion from a passive and inward personality? 
This is related to the nature of compassion of the Buddhist arahant. The contest here 
is that arahant’s compassion is inward and inactive. It is only mere thought. Therefore, 
this cannot be considered, accordingly as real compassion. It does not possess enough 
practical compassion. The ground for this argument seems to be based on two 
reasons: misinterpretation of compassion; misunderstanding of the notion of 
meditation and other methods of mental culture.  
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Some scholars have misinterpreted the arahant’s compassion. For example, Edward 
Conze126 writes that, "The Yogin can only come into contact with the unconditioned 
when he brushes aside anything which is conditioned." Taking the same line of 
argument G.S.P. Misra127 writes that in the final analysis, all actions are to be put to 
cessation since the Buddha speaks of happiness that is involved in non-action which he 
further says is an integral part of the Right Way.  However, it should be noted that 
these claims are contradictory to the real teachings of Buddhism.  
 
These accusations seem to be based on the idea of the traditional ascetic. The Buddha 
and his disciples were more socially-linked beings. I have already pointed out that ideal 
solitude and ideal detachment has nothing to do with separation from others. The 
arahants are well-established in the society with good human relations. Even in the 
practice of meditation the locus is the other. Not harming others and helping other 
take the centre of a virtuous meditation. By getting rid of the taint of ill-will, the 
arahant lives benevolently in mind; and compassionately for the welfare of all 
creatures and beings, he purifies the mind of the taint of ill-will.128 It is enough to say 
that in both aspects of practice and doctrine in Buddhism, enough proof can be 
deduced to deny the accusation of passivity and inwardness of compassion in 
arahants.   
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The next ground of accusation seems to be the non-comprehension or 
miscomprehension of Buddhist meditation and its techniques. Compassion is mostly 
related with four sublime qualities and some jhanic techniques. However, it cannot be 
reduced merely to an inward quality because of this. Compassion is taken into 
consideration in all the threefold discipline (morality, concentration, and wisdom) and 
in the conduct of arahants. Therefore, the accusation is invalid and groundless.   
 
However, these critical philosophical issues on arahants’ active compassion are made 
possible by several reasons. The prominent among them are the very definition of the 
enlightened being and the Buddha’s hesitation to teach the dhamma. Besides, 
detachment and passion in ordinary sense represents opposite ends. On such ground, 
arguing for active compassion in such a being seems contradictory at the surface level. 
However, when the correct doctrinal aspects, definitions, and practical characteristics 
of the emancipated beings are taken into consideration, positioning compassion in 
them becomes plausible. In contrast to some philosophical criticisms presented against 
active emancipated person, Buddhism offers actual admiration to the emancipated 







Summary of the Chapter 
 
1. The concept of desire has many terms and meanings in Buddhism and operates 
in many arrears and doctrines like the doctrine of Dependent Co-origination, 
and the teachings for a balanced moral life. 
 
2. One meaning of desire as clinging (tanha) has made many to argue that 
Buddhism advocates the eradication of all desires. However, the main reason 
for the emphasis on the eradication of this kind of desire is to strengthen the 
mind of the recluse. 
 
3. Buddhism’s understanding of desire can be seen through three personalities 
namely the mundane personality, the Bodhisatta and the enlightened 
personality—arahant. 
 
4. While the desire-for-others is less manifested in the mundane personality 





5. This manifestation takes the dimension of compassion and altruism in social life 
and this compassion and altruism is also historically identified in Sakyamuni 
Buddha’s conduct and in the formation of the Sangha. 
 




The grounds and manifestations of Desire for other that I discussed from two different 
points of views display both similarities and differences. The term desire is used with a 
succession of meanings in Buddhism and it is mostly used as one of the fundamental 
roots of continuous existence. However, the meaning of the term in Buddhism 
depends on the person in which it is positioned and according to the context in which 
it is used. First, desire has a negative connotation in the mundane person.  However, it 
can motivate one to lead a harmless life and positive active life to both oneself and the 
others. Secondly, the Buddhist emancipation is considered as the eradication of 
unwholesome desire and transformation and cultivation of wholesome desires. 
 
In the Levinasian account, desire is the fundamental structure of human relations. 
Desire means a personal drive for responsibility towards others. Diverse notions are 
used to signify the other or one’s fellow human beings. The face is often used for this 
task. The other in this context transcends the subject’s supremacy. Furthermore, 
desire in Levinas is metaphysical. However, metaphysics here is given a radically 
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different meaning. To a considerable extent, Levinas’ Philosophy can be identified as 
an analysis of the link between the subject and the face (Other).  
 
Three similarities can be deduced from the foregoing discussion, (1) the consideration 
of desire as ethical (2) non-possessive desire to assist the others and (3) non-
deliberative desire aroused by the other. Four differences can also be deduced (1)  the 
person in which the two systems situate desire for the other(2) the analysis given to  
non-deliberative desire, (3) the nature of ethics and (4) the substantiality of the self.  
 
4.1  Similarities 
 
4.1.1  Desire as Ethical 
 
The first and apparent similarity concerns the idea of desire being ethical. For Levinas, 
desire is ethical as it reaches towards the other transcending interiority of the subject. 
It occurs without any conceptualization of the other. The other is respected and 
helped without the destruction of his alterity.  The other is beyond assimilation.   
Language provides an avenue for a relationship between the subject and the other. 
Such language is not limited to the vocal but rather extends to the whole body of the 
other. This kind of language is not monotonous or idle chatting rather it is a language 
that calls for responsibility. In other words the epiphany of the face speaks and 




According to early Buddhism, a mundane person sees himself as a separate being. He 
is called mundane/untutored/uneducated (putujjana) as he considers himself a 
separate entity or a separate being. The core structure of this personality, as explained 
in the third chapter, is having the concepts of ‘this is mine, this I am, and this is my 
self.’129 Self conception is a dominant force in such a character. He is naturally egoistic. 
However, such a personality too can have a desire for others’ wellbeing, though this 
cannot be considered as totally driven by other’s face. That is to say such a desire for 
the other is tainted by attachment and selfishness. This desire cannot be seen as 
altruism in which one risks himself and driven only by the thought of removing other’s 
suffering without any selfish interest.  
 
Here, Buddhism can be seen as being more realistic. It accepts that average man is 
naturally egoistic until such a person understands reality. This means that such egoism 
emanates from ignorance. However, though the mundane personality is considered 
egocentric by nature, the guidance given to correct him seems to depict a similarity 
with the Levinasian account. Buddhism teaches the need for being attentive to others’ 
wellbeing. One is advised not to consider other as mere passive objects as well as 
reducing One’s care for others. One should act not to harm others even for a very 
trivial means.  
 
The second personality, Bodhisatta has more related characteristics to the Levinasian 
account. As illustrated in the 3rd chapter, the Bodhisatta is different from both 
mundane person and the arahant, the emancipated person. However, it is essential to 
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remember that this personality too is under the mental structure of “this is mine, this I 
am, and this is my self.” Nonetheless, it differs from the mundane character as he is 
oriented towards perfect enlightenment with the intention of bringing about other’s 
welfare. Moreover, he abandons his own emancipation because of others. 
Additionally, it is useful to remind ourselves that he is driven by perfect enlightenment 
or Buddhahood. To attain this, he needs to train himself. Therefore, his acts are not 
thoroughly devoid of egoistic structure. However, he is better oriented to other’s 
wellbeing than the mundane person who is mostly oriented towards himself.  
 
In summary the goal of the Bodhisatta  is to be a perfect Buddha. Being such a person 
brings happiness and meaning to the world in which he lives. In the bid to achieve 
enlightenment, he assists others as a spiritual teacher and spiritual friend in addition to 
the other great roles he plays. Being emancipated he strives for others’ emancipation 
by offering constant aid. Thus, his goal is directed towards others’ happiness and 
wellbeing. The path, which promotes others’ welfare, is full of sacrifices. Though he 
has the intention to become a fully perfected Buddha, his conduct is full of altruistic 
deeds. He helps others to acquire long life, beauty, happiness, strength, wisdom, and 
finally liberation. Therefore, his dedication for the other is both spiritual and material. 
 
The ethical culture related with desire is also found in Bodhisatta’s practice. For 
Vessantara Jataka, the other’s face represents human beings. King Vessantara assisted 
all kinds of people. Among them were beggars, commoners, innocent people suffered 
from long-time starvation and distress, ministers, and even kings. His desire was a kind 
of love for others’ wellbeing.  
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Samm Sambuddha and arahant, the third category, can be taken as the ideal 
personality parallel to Levinas’ subject.  A person highly motivated by the ‘desire for 
others’ is clearly seen in the arahant’s conduct. As pointed out in the historical and 
doctrinal aspects of the enlightened persons discussed before were based on the 
character of Gotama the Buddha, It suffices to mention that this character signifies an 
egoless mental structure. Even though such a character is reckoned as one who has 
given up both merits and demerits, his conduct is said to be wholesome as his actions 
are devoid of attachment, hatred and confusion.130 Having abandoned all 
unwholesome roots/states, he is endowed with wholesome states/roots.131 Until he 
passes away he solely acts for others’ welfare. As he is devoid of an egoist mental 
structure ‘this is mine, this I am, and this is my self,’ he is not driven by any sort of 
egoistic motives.  
 
It has been explained that the Buddha worked for others’ wellbeing. Taken his forty 
five years career after enlightenment as example, it is very easy to point out his 
kindness towards all the beings. In all those cases otherness were respected. He aided 
all the faces he found in need. And engaged in a tireless service until he passed away. 
 
In the eyes of the Buddha every being except emancipated beings, are essentially in 
need of help either mentally or physically. As pointed out in the third chapter he exists 
necessarily for the happiness of the multitude. He admires neither mere knowledge 
nor mere conduct. The two qualities should go together. He has the knowledge of 
others’ distress. Therefore, his every step was focused to release others’ from 
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suffering. It is a compassionate conduct. As pointed out earlier, both wisdom and 
virtue (compassion) are given similar value.  Virtue represents compassionate conduct 
while wisdom represents an understanding of the reality of others’ suffering and 
seeing a responsibility to help.  Seeing others’ suffering and being moved to assist 
them is nothing but an ethical desire.  
 
Furthermore, the fourth of the nine epithets of the Buddha is ‘sugato’ which means 
one who went forth to the world out of compassion for people in need of help. These 
others were in need of help for different reasons. It may be due to physical or mental 
illness, due to defilements or due to social oppression or injustice. The Buddha walked 
in most part of North India on foot for others’ happiness. For the commentaries,132 the 
Buddha’s habits were naturally skilful and therefore he never suffered because of 
unskillful habits.  His conduct was excellent in the sense of being pro-social.  
 
One of the two ways the Buddha’s kept contact with others is by going to meet the 
needy and not waiting for them to come to him. For example Sunta was a low-caste 
downtrodden person. The Buddha wanted to help him. He reached out to him. The 
downtrodden person was advised and ordained by the Buddha, thereby freeing 
himself from social, cultural, and economical barriers. He was then guided towards 
enlightenment. Finally Sunta became one of the great disciples of Buddhist order. His 
first hand description reveals the fact.  He was despised, disregarded, and reviled by 
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men. He was peaceful and contented with the Buddha’s help.133 This is possible as the 
Buddha is free from all bondages.  
 
It seems that the alterity of the other is also preserved in the process of helping him or 
her. All persons assisted by Buddha are not directly related to his spiritual path. Some 
of them were worldly people who enjoyed sensual lives. Looking at it superficially, 
there may seem to be a problem with regard to the protection of otherness. Buddhism 
presents a formal ethical path, and a particular goal, and this seems to be a destruction 
of the spontaneity of otherness. It is true that Buddhism presents a path and a 
particular emancipation structure. However, the path is not followed forcefully. Also 
the method of attaining emancipation differs from person to person though the same 
eightfold path is presented as its practical path. Moreover, though the taste and the 
bliss of nibbana are considered equal, plurality is not suspended. Even after being 
enlightened the individual differences persisted. However, the unwholesome mental 
defilements are uprooted. Other personal differences exist with them. The living 
arahants show differences in their personality traits irrespective of the realization the 
same reality. 
 
Besides, certain differences are found with regard to arahants interests. For instance 
some arahants preferred living in forests while others preferred living in a village. Their 
attitudes on certain rituals and customs are also different. However, their conduct is 
based on the theory of not harming others or oneself and doing wellbeing for both 
sides. Besides, the Buddha never considered community of monks and nuns as his 
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possessions. His attitude was that he was only a teacher134 and each has to bear his or 
her responsibility for destruction of one’s own defilements. Each and everyone are 
considered as specific beings. The arahant is called ‘assaddho’135 to show that he is not 
bound by mere faith neither to a teacher nor to a path. All these aspects reveal the 
possibility of plurality and protection of alterity of the others. This is a clear evidence 
to show that Buddhism is committed to plurality even in the spiritually advanced 
personalities.  
 
The compassion of the Buddha can be taken as an ethical desire to help the other. The 
very definition of compassion says that the arahant is moved by other’s suffering. The 
Buddha is identified as ‘the lord of compassion’ (mahkruniko) for his well-
established compassion and well-moved practical conduct. Emancipated being is 
infinitely compassionate (appama) and therefore he leads other towards 
emancipation as it is the everlasting bliss of the life. Furthermore, this is depicted in 
the advice to the first group of disciples to lead others towards welfare, blessing, and 
happiness, as their ultimate purpose.136 Thus, compassion depicts an inevitable 
character of an emancipated being.   
 
Most of the qualities Levinas presents regarding a person desiring the other’s well 
being are well represented in the Buddhist view of enlightened persons. Thus, they too 
seem to present a sort of ethical desire.  They act for the sake of others with no 
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fixation, objectification, and thematization. Their duty seems to focus only on doing 
good for others.  
 
4.1.2  Non-Possessive Desire 
 
The second similarity is on non-possessive desire found in the structure of helping 
others. Levinas account of desire for the other illustrates a non-possessive mode of 
desire. The subject is non-possessive for many reasons. The other is infinite and the 
subject cannot possess infinity. The other does not have a particular shape or colour or 
direction. One cannot possess a being that uses language. The others’ whole body can 
express. The entire assumption the subject makes regarding the other will inevitably 
be rendered futile by the other’s expression.  The other can, at any time, deny or 
oppose the subject’s conception of him. The other, being a thinking being cannot be 
categorized or totalized. Having a preconception with regard to a thinking being means 
a violation of his alterity. Only dead person, tools, instruments, and objects can be 
thematized or conceptualized as none of them can react by replying, opposing or 
changing the assumptions made regarding them.  For Levinas, the Other can oppose 
even at the death bed. 
 
Since the other possesses all the above listed qualities, he cannot be under the 
dominion of the subject whatsoever. Thus, one’s acts are established as non-
possessive. The subject does not act with the intention of fulfilling one’s expectations 
though the subject is awakened by the other’s need.  For Levinas, thought cannot be 
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deduced from biological consciousness137 since thought is the consciousness of the 
new.138 The desire-for-other does not originate from my possessive requirement. It 
originates from goodness. This goodness emerges in a subject that is driven by a 
metaphysical desire for the other. 
 
The Buddhist account on this point is also threefold. The mundane person is driven by 
egoistic motives as previously explained. His acts are driven either by wholesome roots 
or unwholesome roots. However, all these are based on the mentality of my, I, and my 
self. Therefore, most of the acts of such a person present a possessive characteristic.  
All good motives/drives are classified under a category of wholesome roots in 
Buddhism. The principles and prescriptions Buddhism presents depend on their 
pragmatic value. Most teachings of the Buddha are pragmatically based. This is 
ascertained by the Buddha’s own claim that humans are never asked to practice his 
teaching unless it is practicable. He further says that he taught others only pragmatic 
things.  
 
 In Buddhism, acts that are driven by others’ suffering are considered wholesome, so 
are all acts that produce beneficial results for others. Acts of ordinary human beings 
can be possessive to certain degrees. Some acts may be extremely possessive while 
some others can represent less possessiveness. Moreover, there can be some more 
acts which are based on non-possessive mode. One such act is found in the notion of 
‘altruistic joy’ (mudit) which is included in four-sublime qualities. This is considerably 
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found in a well trained compassionate human being. He is happy with other’s 
happiness. Such person is happy with anyone’s happiness though the person may be 
unknown or not related to him. He expects nothing from anyone. And he is non-
possessively satisfied with other’s happiness.  Compassion (karu) too emphasizes 
this skill. To be moved by other’s suffering to help, the suffering person may not 
necessarily be related to him. In such a case he wishes only to remove the pain the 
sufferer undergoes. He wishes to release the victim from suffering. The compassionate 
being does not have time to conceptualize the other. He is not oriented towards gains 
from such a person. He just makes the other free from trouble. This is a natural move 
and it is non-possessive. 
 
Another such concept is right thought (samm sankappa), the second of the eightfold 
path. An ordinary person can have right thought which is threefold, namely thought of 
renunciation, of non-ill will (greed) (charity), and of non-violence.  All these thoughts 
lead one to non-possessive acts. The opposite of these three are identified as intention 
governed by desire, intention governed by ill-will, and intention governed by 
harmfulness. These are morally bad as they are directed by a possessive mode of 
being. The right thought/intention suggests that it is possible to establish non-
possessive acts in an ordinary human personality. One such person can act for others’ 
wellbeing. How one engages in such acts depends on one’s cultivation. Some are more 
accustomed to do it while some others are less accustomed. However, at the end 




Desire to do good, altruistic joy, threefold pain, right thought, fourfold bases of 
solidarity, are classified under wholesome roots. All these aspects explain the Buddhist 
view of non-possessive conduct of a mundane person.  The degree of the non-
possessive drive in a mundane person may differ. However, its possibility is accepted in 
Buddhism.  
 
The next discussion is on Bodhisatta’s non-possessive conduct. As analyzed earlier, the 
Bodhisatta is strong on having non-possessive desire for others’ wellbeing. The 
Bodhisatta possesses more advanced non-possessive skill compared to the ordinary 
person due to his specific Bodhisatta characteristics already indicated on several 
occasions. All the ordinary motives he possesses take on a more wholesome form as 
he has trained himself in the advanced characteristics. He is closer to the fully 
enlightened one and is further from mundane person. The Bodhisatta Siddhattha’s 
renunciation indicates the ultimate possibility of acquiring a non-possessive attitude. 
All his acts are regarded as less possessive or non-possessive. A more advanced degree 
of compassion and wisdom are found in him as compared to the mundane personality. 
He is powered by them to act non-possessively. 
 
Others’ predicaments led him to seek a lasting solution for suffering. However, he 
cannot be said to be totally altruistic as he is on his journey to enlightenment. Some 
possessive character traits may exist in him. One can argue that all his acts are directed 
to his emancipation goal. Therefore, the others are secondary to the goal or others 
were used as a ladder to reach his goal.  This is a double edged argument as it cannot 
be totally denied or proved. Nevertheless, his renunciation alone can be taken as a 
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huge departure from having a possessive attitude. The one who would cast everything 
away cannot have the idea of helping others with such a base motive. Thus, 
Siddhattha’s conduct is closer to a non-possessive character. His move is not to gain 
any personal advantage. It is mostly done for the sake of others.   
 
The second aspect is revealed in Bodhisatta-literature. As sources indicate Bodhisatta 
Sumedha’s aspiration was to be a ferry and bridge for others to attain the 
emancipation, the eternal bliss.  His wish was to make others free. It was not based on 
a selfish motive. For Visuddhimagga, he sacrificed his own happiness for others’ 
happiness. He was moved to do this as he was driven by an unshakable loving-
kindness. 
 
The arahant’s acts are really non-possessive too. As the Buddha and arahants have 
abandoned all the taints (taint of sensual pleasure, of existence, of views, of 
ignorance), it is impossible for them to have possessive attitude. From them, the most 
significant is the ‘destruction of taint of views.’ Instead of ‘taint of views’, they have 
replaced it with ‘right vision’ through which they cognize the world. Such personalities 
show no possibility of egoism. Therefore, possessive acts are impossible for them. As 
said earlier, the arahant has eradicated the root of self consciousness (my, I, and my 
self). There cannot be any egoism in him. Or else, it would be contradictory to the 
Buddhist analysis of an arahant.  
 
As I mentioned previously, the Buddha completely dedicated his entire 45 years in the 
service of others. He was entirely driven by the compassion and wisdom. He continued 
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his spiritual service irrespective of blames, accusations, rejections and some more 
physical injuries. Like a lotus in contaminated water he lived for others’ welfare. 
 
Furthermore, since emancipation is described as happiness, moral perfection, 
realization and freedom, it is impossible for such a personality to have a possessive 
attitude.  Such a transformation is only possible if he is really driven by complete 
compassion and wisdom. The three other aspects regarding arahant namely, vigilance, 
attentiveness, carefulness do not allow for a transmission of selfish conduct. It is said 
that the arahant is such a perfect being that it is simply impossible for him to commit 
an immoral act. According to Sandakasutta139 an arahant is incapable of willfully 
depriving the life of a living being. The Buddha’s kind treatment towards Sunta 
changed his whole life style into a meaningful and delightful one. Yet, the Buddha 
never gained or expected to gain anything from anyone that he benefitted.  
 
The Buddha’s kind conduct is illustrated here to demonstrate the fact that he did not 
seek any selfish gains, be it cultural, economic, social, political, or personal. Upli,140 
Nigantha Nataputta’s a chief lay disciple was fascinated by the Buddha’s teaching and 
requested to be his follower. Then the Buddha advised him to reconsider the decision 
claiming that one should not take decisions at the height of one’s emotions. Again 
Upli asked the Buddha’s permission and then the Buddha granted it under one 
condition. That condition was not to stop giving alms to Jain monks as he used to do. 
This is a unique characteristic to depict that the Buddha’s or arahant’s acts are really 
non-possessive. There is no doctrinal argument to refute this non-possessive structure 
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of arahants in early Buddhism. Therefore, Levinasian view on non-possessive move is 
considerably compatible with an arahant’s life. 
 
4.1.3  Non-Deliberative Act 
 
The third similarity pertains to the idea of non-deliberative desire. Levinasian analyses 
of this concept take similar form with the Buddhist idea of the emancipated 
personality.  
 
For Levinas, the subject’s responsibility towards the Other are non-deliberative. As 
pointed out earlier too, the structure of one’s relation with the Other is not based on a 
subjective structure and since the Other motivates the subject to act. The intentional 
component takes a secondary value, thereby going against the traditional account and 
role of subjective intention in an action. Here, the link with the other is a link with 
infinity.   Infinity is out of time, and is not limited by any temporality. The other is an 
enigma with regard to time.  This enigma, as pointed out by Paperzak,141 is not a 
phenomena, neither does it occur in a present, nor is it the activity of a consciousness, 
but it insulates itself within phenomena, as both their condition and their limit. The 
Other is beyond being and cannot be constrained to a time-frame. The consciousness 
and the present are exceeded by the Other. Moreover, for Levinas, ethics begins from 
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the infinite and the subject is subordinate to infinity.142 The Other is therefore beyond 
intention and consciousness.  
 
How can one be attributed with the responsibility of an action under this analysis? 
Intention is generally accepted as the basis to attribute responsibility for a deliberate 
action. On Levianas’ analysis, the Other is metaphysically stronger than the 
consciousness or intention of the subject.  For Levinas, responsibility comes from 
outside not inside, the subject’s consciousness. The subject exists for the absolute 
responsibility towards the other. The subject is often in an asymmetrical relation with 
the other. 
 
Though freedom and choice in ontology are admitted as essential aspects of 
attributing responsibility for an action, in the Levinasian account, they do not function 
as such. The power of the Other prevails. In this new account of responsibility, the 
subject is unlimitedly responsible for others. Levinas says that “the more I am just, the 
more I am guilty.”143 It is clear that one is responsible not only for his doing but also for 
things unintended.  Therefore, responsibility is prior to freedom, a past before origin. 
The subject becomes a hostage under this analysis. Responsibility therefore leaves no 
time, no present for recollection or return into the self.144  
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In the end, Levinas’ notion of non-intentionality is based on his conception of the 
other. As the Other is metaphysically stronger than the subject, responsibility, 
freedom, and ethics starts from him.  By positioning the other’s supremacy over the 
subject, Levinas challenges traditional ontology of being. By doing this he has provided 
power to non-intentionality refuting traditionally given significance to intention, 
deliberation, choice making and all the other concepts related to ethics.  
 
It seems possible to find a concordant view of this Levinasian analysis on non-intention 
and the Buddhist view of it. It is obvious that Buddhism cannot be wholly aligned to 
this Levinasian view. However, a similarity can be found.  
 
According to early Buddhism the mundane personality can rarely act non-intentionally, 
so he is not a candidate for which the notion of non-intentionality applies. In contrast, 
the Bodhisatta shows a considerably more developed form of non-intentionality in 
acting on other’s well-being. Bodhisatva characteristics mentioned earlier are relevant 
here. Though his major intention is perfect enlightenment we can see non-intentional 
acts in him in the Levinasian sense.   
 
The Bodhisatta is taught to offer everything including his life for others. It then means 
that the Bodhisatta thinks that he is responsible for others. If not, he will not be moved 
to offer his life in any situation. His responsibility seems infinite. It is not limited to any 
time frame. Responsibility comes prior to consciousness. In the Buddhist literature, the 
Bodhisatta is seen as offering everything to the other including his life. In such cases, 
the subject (Bodhisatta) considerably becomes a hostage of the other. It is obvious 
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that Bodhisatta shows non-intentional acts irrespective of his deep orientation to the 
perfect enlightenment. The other often forces him to offer himself.  
 
Moreover, non-intentional act is possible in an emancipated personality from two 
dimensions. The first is that emancipated personality is transformed in different sense 
as illustrated before.  The Intention of such a person is different from the mundane 
person. It is not driven by self consciousness: my; I; my self.  Self-motivated drives are 
impossible for him. He has done what had to be done and there is nothing more to do. 
Such personality shows the ideal form of non-intentional act. Secondly, his conduct is 
considered as full of lapsed actions (ahetuka kamma). This means he has consumed all 
kammas. He does not have a new existence. As his acts are conducted with a 
dispassionate mind there is no future existence for such acts. The arahant is not driven 
by the commonly accepted intention, and therefore his acts can be considered as non-
intentional.  
 
As they have such a transformed personality that it is not selfishly driven, his conduct 
is mostly driven by others’ suffering. The Buddha’s altruistic acts mentioned earlier 
depict this. His actions as a spiritual teacher and spiritual friend reveal this. Sunta, a 
low caste person was helped by the Buddha. The Buddha was moved by his 
compassion upon witnessing the suffering of Sunta.  Kisagotami, and Pacr were 
helped in the same manner. The other’s suffering caused the Buddha to act. The story 
of Angulimla explains the nature of this asymmetrical relationship. Seeing the 
troubled Angulimala the Buddha went to help him and Angulimala   was helped. The 
Buddha often was alert to others’ suffering. The daily routine of the Buddha was 
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entirely dedicated to this purpose. As the emancipated person is devoid of egoistic-
feeling, he is naturally moved by others’ sufferings. He has sharpened his compassion 
and wisdom to go to others’ help at any moment of their life. The Buddha’s dedication 
to other’s wellbeing until his last breath clearly shows this.  
 
4.2  Differences:  
 
Despite those resemblances there are a considerable number of differences between 
the two traditions regarding the analysis of  Desire. These disparities do not suggest 
that they are totally different from each other. However, it is reasonable to claim that 
they represent two sorts of dimensions with regard to the same social relation 
between human beings.  
 
4.2.1  The Situated Personality 
 
The first distinction is with regard to the personality in which the two systems situate 
the ‘desire-for-other’. Levinas categorizes the Desire-for -other as a common drive that 
everyone is gifted with whereas Buddhism restricts this kind of altruistic (though this 
term is not does necessarily what Levinas refers to) virtues only to the spiritually 
advanced persons. Desire for Levinas is common to all human beings irrespective of 
their differences. As Levinas pointed out, one can ignore Other’s request for help. 
However, it does not provide him an opportunity to run away from his responsibility. 
He cannot deny responsibility put upon him.  Even when the Other does not 




In this relationship, the desire-for-other takes a unique shape as it varies from 
traditional ontology. Instead of the concept of being-for-oneself, Levinas emphasizes 
the being for-the-other. In this idea, the most significant is not me but the other.  Even 
at one’s death, he helps others by giving the example of death to others. The human 
being (Other) is given a godlike value in Levinas philosophy, though he does not 
explicitly say it. The desire for others or one’s infinite responsibility for others is 
positioned in each and every person. Each and everyone are born with this 
responsibility and die with this responsibility.  
 
However, the Buddhist view regarding this idea is considerably different. The mundane 
personality cannot be considered as a fully developed person with regard to the 
desire-for-others as presented in the Levinasian philosophy. For Buddhism, the 
mundane man is essentially egocentric. All his conduct is egoistic as he is driven by the 
very fundamental egoistic roots of my, I, and my self. Though it is possible for him to 
have wholesome roots of action as mentioned earlier too, he is more prone to 
unwholesome roots. He is generally accustomed to acting from unwholesome roots.  
 
Therefore, the whole account of responsibility and the other’s dominancy in Levinas 
cannot be applied to the Buddhist analysis in a similar sense. The most important thing 
to a mundane personality is himself. He loves himself more than others. It is the 
common nature of the human beings. Therefore, a contradiction is found between the 
two traditions on the issue of where such desire (desire-for-others) is situated. While 
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Levinas positions it in every person, the Buddhism seems to place it more in the 
Bodhisatta and the emancipated person, and less on the mundane person.   
 
4.2.2  On Non-Intentionality 
 
The second point of contradistinction between the two systems rests on the analysis of 
non-intentionality in spite of the similarity I examined earlier.  For Levinas, Desire is 
non-intentional even though it is admitted that the subject determines to whom he 
reacts, whether to the face or to the third-party. We need not find intention behind 
this. Being a hostage of the face, the subject assists the other non-intentionally. He 
goes for other’s help.  
 
Every time, the other comes to the subject as a new face. The consequence is that the 
other cannot be conceptualized and comprehended. The base of the action is moved 
from the agent to the other in Levinasian philosophy. Thus consciousness and 
intention is not given a dominant power in this system. Instead, the other replaces 
them. Finally, non-intention becomes greatly significant than the intention which was 
highly admitted and promoted in traditional ontology and which supported the being 
of the person. The replacement of intentionality and consciousness with non-
intentionality marks a great change in Levinasian philosophy.  
 
The Buddhist view on non-intentionality is contradictory to Levinasian view for several 
reasons. Firstly, according to early Buddhism, ethical responsibility is attributable only 
for acts driven by intention. The fundamental basis of action (kamma) is 
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intention/volition. For Buddhism kamma refers only to volitional actions. For the 
Buddha, volition is a vital component of an action. One performs bodily actions, of 
speech and of mind through volition.145 Volition is the compulsory mental factor 
responsible for kammas. The wholesome and unwholesome nature of an ethical action 
is determined on the basis of intention. Until one attains emancipation he is ethically 
responsible for any volitional/intentional act as all such acts are basically driven by the 
self conception of ‘this is mine’, ‘this I am’, and ‘this is my self.’  Free-will, choice-
making, is possible only if the significance of intention is admitted according to 
Buddhism. One needs an element of initiative (rabbha-dhtu) or free-will (atta-kra), 
to make decisions. This factor of freedom and its correlation with moral acts and their 
consequences make individual moral responsibility a reality according to early 
Buddhism.    
 
It is clear then that non-intentional act in ethics marks a disparity between these two 
traditions. While Levinas give priority to the other, Buddhism offers priority to 
intentionality and the self as a decision making entity. However, the emancipated 
personality seems to have considerable similarity with the Levinasian subject who is 
mostly driven by the other’s suffering.    
 
4.2.3  The Nature of Ethics 
 
The nature of ethics presents the third difference. Levinas’s key concept regarding 
ethics is responsibility. For him, the I is responsible more than the others and the I is 
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responsible even for the other’s responsibilities. The other acts as the centre of 
responsibility. The subject is bound up with infinite responsibility. Moreover, as the 
other is out of conceptualization, one cannot think in a cost and benefit way. 
Responsibility is prior to conceptualization. One becomes a hostage of the other.  
 
So, Levinas’ analysis of ethics is based on the concept of metaphysical desire. As the 
face is situated in the centre of ethics, ethics takes a different structure from 
conventionally admitted ethics. Therefore, Levinas made a whole new system of ethics 
by providing new definitions to old ethical concepts and producing new ethical 
concepts such as freedom, choice-making, intention, deliberation and 
conceptualization. As the subject is responsible more than the other, no one is in a 
position to deny one’s given responsibility. 
 
Since Levinasian ethics is metaphysical it is insatiable. The responsibility for the other is 
constant and it is contradictory to the concept of satiety. “The face puts into question 
the sufficiency of my identity as an I, it compels me to an infinite responsibility.”146 
Satiety and knowledge belong to ontology while the non-comprehension and insatiety 
belong to Levinasian analysis of responsibility for the other. It is said that desire is not 
fulfilled. It is sharpened. The more one attempts to fulfill his responsibility for the 
other, the more it intensifies instead of being satisfied.  
 
It is necessary first to state that Buddhism does not have a systematically developed 
ethical system as can be found in Greek philosophy. However, using the materials 
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scattered in various discourses a complete system of ethics can be constructed and 
various Buddhist scholars are still working on this. The ultimate goal of Buddhism is an 
attainment that consists of four characteristics, namely happiness, moral perfection, 
realization and freedom.147 However, for some other scholars148 this ultimate goal 
consists of three principles and interrelated aspects: the attainment of emancipation, 
attainment of a kind of insight which in itself has an ethical value, and an attainment of 
moral perfection or a moral transformation.  As emancipation is considered the 
highest level of moral perfection in Buddhism, all other moral concepts are evaluated 
based on it. As shown before, this attainment and the path leading to it depend on 
personal training. The eightfold path is directly related to the gradual training of a 
person. And this eightfold path is further divided into threefold division of morality, 
concentration, and wisdom.  
 
The responsibility of one’s final liberation is given to the subject. One is taught to be an 
island to oneself.149 In one’s training the Buddha can only guide and the mind is taken 
as the most crucial component of every aspect of morality. Giving the mind, the 
priority of the subject instead of the face or the other is established.   
 
Moreover, most of the Buddhist recommendations and principles of moral conduct are 
based on consistent process of reasoning. In the discourse of Klma150 the possibility 
of having independent moral inquiry is revealed. Inquirers are advised not to depend 
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on moral authorities, but to make their own judgment on moral questions based on 
facts and verifications. One’s rationality is given an opportunity to determine moral 
conduct. However, it is further instructed that one should pay attention to the 
consequences (happiness or unhappiness produced by the course) of actions that one 
intends to perform. In the Bhtitkasutta,151 the rational ground of morality is again 
emphasized by an instruction to be concerned about praiseworthiness or 
blameworthiness of one’s conduct. 
 
It is said that if a conduct produces harm for others or the subject it is unwholesome. 
Here, the actual consequences of an action to the subject and the other are taken into 
consideration. A more developed form of this view is found in Ambalahikrhulovda 
sutta152 where it advises that when one wishes to perform an action, be it speech, 
thinking or physical action, he should consider/contemplate the action in terms of 
consequences. 
 
The two important aspects to be considered when human action is examined in terms 
of consequences are (1) does the contemplated action directly or remotely connect 
with the emancipation? and (2) does it improve one’s position in continuous 
existence? 153 This shows that Buddhist ethics is based on a final goal. It is worthy to 
note that contemplation is emphasized here. If the consequence(s) of an action is to be 
contemplated before such action takes place, then one’s subjective interference is 
highly needed. This goes against the Levinasian view of responsibility for the other. In 
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the Buddhist context the subject is not merely moved by metaphysical desire for 
others. The aim of the person (deliverance) is also accepted. In this sense then the two 
traditions do not agree. 
 
4.2.4  Personality and Substance 
 
The fourth disparity between the two traditions is found in the idea of persons as 
substance. While it seems that Levinas admits the notion of a person as a substance, 
Buddhism rejects it. According to  the Buddhist view the person is defined as a 
‘performance’; and every ‘individual’- man, god, or animal- is only a ‘being,’ a 
becoming, consisting of present fresh performance added to the sum-total of that 
particular being’s past action, the whole constituting a coherent flux that is 
conventionally called ‘an individual.’154 The discourses define human personality as 
existence of fivefold physical and mental aggregate: aggregate of the corporeality; of 
the feeling; of the perception; of the mental-formation; of the consciousness. The 
mere process of this fivefold physical and psychical phenomenon is identified as the 
existence of an individual. However, according to the central Buddhist teaching of 
dependent co-origination these five aggregates neither singly nor collectively 
constitute any self-dependent real personality or ego. Believing such eternal or 
temporal existence of an entity is only an illusion according to the teaching of 
impermanence (annica). 
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The relation of the past is discussed through the concept of aggregates of formation 
(sakhrakkandha). Formation builds the link with one’s future existence too.  The 
central Buddhist teaching of action (Kamma) is directly related to this concept. One’s 
store of past actions is considered as the kamma in this specific context. Furthermore, 
the order of kamma”, i.e. good actions produce good results and bad actions produce 
bad results, is considered as one of the five fixed laws in the world. 
 
It is clear that for Buddhist account there is no fixed, eternal entity called person. The 
concept of person is discussed using the verbs instead of nouns. In the discourse of 
Khajjanya,155 the five aggregates are explained as processes rather than entities.  
Therefore, it is impossible for Buddhism to identify either the ‘same’ or ‘other’ with the 
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To sum up, I have analyzed the concept of desire-for-other and pointed out that 
Levinas’ view and Buddhist view on the concept is similar from certain angles and 
different from others.  Sakyamuni Gotama Buddha (6th B. C.) and Emmanuel Levinas 
(20th century A.D) represent two different social, economic, cultural and religious 
contexts. However, given the complexity of the human predicament both of them 
seem to be addressing the same issue but from different point of view. Both of them 
challenged their contemporary philosophies and core social structures. They were not 
happy with the conditions of human life. They found fault in an incorrect 
understanding by traditional and conservative religious and philosophical authorities.  
 
Sakyamuni Gotama denounced the then prevailing social system as he found out that 
such a system is unfortunate for humanism. His quest was to seek a lasting solution to 
suffering, lead a contented, peaceful life and ensure good human relations. The path 
he formulated and the goal he achieved are generally considered as religious in nature. 
After the attainment of unwavering peace of mind, he returned to the people and 
taught the message to the masses, challenging the existing injustice and authoritative 
traditions. Thus, the Buddha’s enlightenment, his teachings, and his mode of social 
relation are based on a specific but realistic ground where egoism is transformed and 




In the same manner, Emmanuel Levinas challenged existing philosophy while 
introducing a new philosophy that enables good human relations in which the other is 
not objectified and ignored under the dominance of the subject. Redefinition of the 
prevailing concepts, introduction of new concepts and breaking up of prevailing 
systems were used by Levinas to realize this purpose. Therefore, it is possible to 
suggest that seeking certain similarities between them is not out of place even though 
they (the Buddha and Levinas) existed in different times and contexts in human 
history.  
 
In this study, it seems that differences are more than similarities.  However, my focus 
is to find the rationality behind the notion of desire-for-other in the two philosophical 
traditions. In this sense then, both the similarities and differences are equally 
significant. 
 
 The similarities in both systems seem very interesting as they establish a strong 
ground for better human relations. The desire-for-other in Buddhism is positioned 
differently in the enlightened person, the Bodhisatta, and the mundane person. The 
degree to which persons will act for others’ wellbeing is dependent upon their spiritual 
progress.   
 
Accordingly, a well-driven Levinasian kind of personality is found in the enlightened 
person.  For Levinas, every human person is driven by this specific desire-for other’s 
wellbeing though one can turn away from it. This is very significant as it is related to 
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certain historical Buddhist characters, namely the arahants. Irrespective of the other 
two beings; the mundane and the Bodhisatta, the historical figures of enlightened 
persons are sufficient to ascertain that there can be human persons in the real world 
as Levinas suggested, who possess the drive to help others and Buddhism also exhorts 
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